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vABSTRACT 
Countering violent extremism (CVE) programs are moving into the realm of 
intervention, diversion, and deflection. These programs require mental health 
professionals to conduct assessments, construct treatment plans, and provide the 
treatment. How can practitioners treat or divert individuals from the path to radicalization 
but also communicate when an individual remains a threat? An understanding of the laws 
that facilitate or restrict disclosure of confidential health info, combined with a structure 
to oversee the process, is critical. Research for this thesis has focused on federal and 
Maryland state laws pertaining to medical record confidentiality and the duty to warn. 
This legal analysis has determined that exceptions exist within medical confidentiality 
laws, enabling mental health practitioners to disclose when a threat exists, and that 
Maryland’s duty-to-warn laws mandate that mental health practitioners have a duty to 
protect third parties from the actions of patients. Due to the varied disciplines involved in 
CVE, collaborative group models are suggested to structure the process.  
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As the threats of homegrown violent extremists have increasingly become a 
reality, the federal government has created a countering violent extremism (CVE) 
program to fill the pre-criminal space. Elements of the CVE program are designed to add 
the missing preventative pieces to traditional methods. The four main parts of the U.S. 
CVE design are community engagement, education on radicalization, counter narratives, 
and intervention programs designed to deter or re-direct individuals from a path to 
radicalization. These parts are the same basic components of the most successful 
precursor models, namely gang diversion1 and substance abuse diversion programs.2 
Law enforcement (LE) plays an integral role in CVE, but the effort also relies 
heavily on other participants and stakeholders. Mental health practitioners must play a 
critical role in both the intervention and education segments of CVE by providing 
essential services, detecting those at risk, and educating others on the radicalization 
process. While LE and mental health practitioners represent two professions dedicated to 
helping others, a mutual understanding or cooperation has historically been lacking.3 This 
conflict of perceived interests and obligations has slowed meaningful collaboration in the 
CVE intervention realm.  
How can mental health providers treat or divert individuals from the path to 
radicalization but still share risk assessments and intelligence with LE when patients pose 
a threat to others? CVE programs involved in intervention and diversion need a 
mechanism or policy in place that facilitates the notification of LE authorities when a 
                                                 1 James C. Howell, “Gang Prevention: An Overview of Research and Programs, Juvenile Justice 
Bulletin,” Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2010, 12, http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED 
518416.  
2 Jason Payne, Max Kwiatkowski, and Joy Wundersitz, Police Drug Diversion: A Study of Criminal 
Offending Outcomes, Research and Public Policy Series, no. 97 (Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 2008), xi. 
3 James R. Corbin, “Confidentiality & the Duty to Warn: Ethical and Legal Implications for the 
Therapeutic Relationship,” The New Social Worker, April 23, 2014, 1, http://www.socialworker.com/ 
api/content/f6758dd1-7700-3ccb-95ab-96de65ea6fcd/.  
 xiv
diversion practitioner suspects that the client is not responding to diversion efforts or a 
determination is made that the individual presents a risk to others.  
The beginning steps involve an understanding of the legal environment that 
applies to the effort. Mental health practitioners are bound by federal and state laws that 
may restrict or facilitate the disclosure of privileged personal health information (PHI).  
A.  MEDICAL RECORD CONFIDENTIALITY 
In reference to medical confidentiality laws, it is imperative that practitioners 
understand the existence of both the federal Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) law and specific state laws. In relation to HIPAA, 
stakeholders must understand that the HIPPA Privacy Rule only identifies two mandatory 
disclosures of PHI, to the patient, and to Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) for auditing purposes. The remaining exceptions provide permissible conditions 
for mental health practitioners to share information. In terms of CVE, the two applicable 
exceptions to confidentiality when a mental health practitioner may disclose information 
are located in paragraphs (j) and (k) of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.4 Paragraph (J) allows a 
medical provider (mental health professional) to disclose PHI when it is “necessary to 
prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health and safety of a person or the 
public.”5 Paragraph (K) presents a broader exception to the federal law in that it allows 
for the disclosure of PHI to protect national security. The paragraph allows for the 
disclosure to “authorized federal officials” for the purpose of conducting “lawful 
intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other national security activities.”6 It is important 
to note that these exceptions to federal law are permissive and do not require the 
disclosure of PHI. It is clear, however, that mental health practitioners involved in 
intervention may, under federal law, disclose otherwise protected information if their 
client poses a threat of violence.  
                                                 4 U.S. Government, 45 CFR Part 164 Subpart E—Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, n.d.), 764–765, accessed August 6, 2016, 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2007-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-2007-title45-vol1-part164-subpartE.pdf. 
5 Ibid., 764. 
6 Ibid., 765. 
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Like the Privacy Rule, Maryland state laws on medical record confidentiality are 
permissive in nature. Maryland law is broader than the federal law in regards with whom 
PHI may be shared. Maryland law allows for the disclosure of PHI to any government 
agency conducting authorized actions (as described by law). Practitioners will be 
challenged when blending state and federal law. Maryland law also allows for the release 
of information for an investigative process. The law does stipulate that the receiving 
agency must have written policies in place to protect the information. Many law 
enforcement (LE) agencies do not have written procedures for the protection and safe 
storing of PHI. As a result, LE agencies involved in CVE actions must create these types 
of policies.  
Practitioners in Maryland must also understand that they must disclose, or not 
disclose, PHI in compliance with the law to be immune from civil action.  
CVE programs may also use consent to share information. Consent is the easiest 
and cleanest practice that may address the issue of communication among stakeholders. 
The process must include a written waiver completed by the client. The waiver must 
include the length of the consent and under what circumstances it may be revoked. Under 
Maryland law, the consent process is described under §4-303.7 
B.  DUTY TO WARN AND PROTECT 
As with medical confidentiality laws, training on duty to warn and protect laws 
will be critical for practitioners involved in CVE intervention and diversion. Mental 
health professionals working with CVE programs should already be well versed on the 
ethical and legal conditions imposed upon their work. The practitioners may not, 
however, have experience working with other professionals from other disciplines. They 
also may not be well versed on the exceptions to confidentiality in relation to the threat 
presented by radicalized persons.  
                                                 7 State of Maryland, 22. Medical Records Act--Duty to Hold Confidential and Duty to Disclose a 
Medical Record, Health-General Article § § 4-301--4-309, 8-601 (Baltimore, MD: Maryland Department 
of Mental Health and Hygiene, n.d.), accessed September 12, 2016, http://dhmh.maryland.gov/psych/pdfs/ 
Medicalreports.pdf.  
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The terms “duty to warn” and “duty to protect” were born of a series of incidents, 
and subsequent legal maneuvers, in California in the late-1960s and mid-1970s. The 
events of concern were litigated in the California case of Tarasoff v. Regents of 
University of California.8 
As duty to warn and duty to protect laws reside at the state level, practitioners 
must be aware of the laws of the state where they are practicing. Additionally, many laws 
are written in a broad manner that does not clearly articulate what is forbidden, mandated, 
or allowed. Many of these laws, such as Maryland’s, allow for discretion. Mental health 
practitioners must have access to legal experts to assist in deciphering and applying the 
law, which is especially important when situations are frequently not the same.  
Maryland is a mandatory duty-to-protect state. The affirmative nature of the duty 
may differ from other states in that it provides for options for which a therapist may act 
and does not specifically dictate which option the therapist must choose. The statute is 
located in Maryland’s Courts and Judicial Proceedings Section §5-609.9 Section (b) 
outlines the mandated duty to protect as occurrences when a mental health care provider 
is aware that a patient is capable of violent behavior against a known victim or group of 
victims. The statue provides immunity from legal or disciplinary action if the provider for 
discharge of the duty to warn or protect. Section (b) also describes the manner in which a 
provider may come to know of the threat posed by a patient as the patient’s spoken word, 
writing, or conduct.10 
Section (c) (2) provides the options for the discharge of the duty that a provider 
may take. The statue allows for discretion on the part of the provider to either seek a 
commitment for the patient, construct a treatment plan to address the potential violence, 
inform a LE agency of the danger posed by the patient, or warn the intended victim(s). If 
                                                 8 “Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California—17 Cal.3d 425—Thu, 07/01/1976|California 
Supreme Court Resources,” accessed August 28, 2016, http://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/tarasoff-v-
regents-university-california-30278. 





the provider decides to provide a warning to LE or the intended victim(s), the stature 
delineates that the warning must include the nature of the threat, the identity of the 
patient, and the identity of the intended victim(s). As a result, Maryland’s law is both a 
duty to warn and a duty to protect statute. The law is mandatory in requiring the therapist 
to take action to protect, but allows discretion in how the provider discharges the duty. 
The law also states that the actions taken by the provider must be both reasonable and 
timely.11 
Mental health practitioners working with CVE programs within the state of 
Maryland are thus bound by state law to protect third parties from the actions of their 
clients. The law does, however, provide a certain amount of discretion in how the 
practitioner addresses the threat. Since CVE programs are collaborative efforts, mental 
health practitioners may rely on advice and input from other disciplines.  
C.  CVE STRUCTURE MODELS 
The Building Resistance against Violent Extremism (BRAVE) model of CVE is 
currently operating in Montgomery County, Maryland, and is expected to expand to other 
jurisdictions.12 
According to its strategic plan, the BRAVE model in Montgomery County 
describes itself as a “collective impact initiative” (CII).13 “Collective Impact is a 
framework to tackle deeply entrenched and complex social problems. It is an innovative 
and structured approach to making collaboration work across government, business, 
philanthropy, non-profit organizations and citizens to achieve significant and lasting 
social change.”14 The idea of a CII was first written about in the Stanford Social 
Innovation Review in 2011. According to the article, five key elements are needed for a 
                                                 11 “Courts and Judicial Proceedings, Section 5-609.” 
12 World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), The Building Resilience 
against Violent Extremism (BRAVE) Model—A Collective Impact Initiative That Increases Public Safety 
and Social Cohesion (Montgomery Village, MD: World Organization for Resource Development and 
Education (WORDE), 2016, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8ZeOqiUkpq2MUZheTd5eUNKRVk/ 
view?usp=sharing&usp=embed_facebook. 
13 Ibid., 12. 
14 “The Collective Impact Framework | Collaboration for Impact,” accessed October 16, 2016, http:// 
www.collaborationforimpact.com/collective-impact/. 
 xviii 
successful program: a common agenda, shared measurements systems, mutually 
reinforcing activities, continuous communication, and a backbone support organization.  
 
Figure 1. Collective Impact Initiative.15 
CIIs are models that may be applied to organizational structures to ensure that 
practitioners are working together to achieve a common goal. The BRAVE model is 
currently the only true community led CVE initiative in existence.  
The BRAVE model also calls for the creation of an intervention task force to 
oversee intervention efforts. While the task force is not currently being used, it is 
envisioned to work in the same manner as a multi-disciplinary team (MDT).16 The MDT 
approach identifies practitioners with critical responsibilities to an issue, and brings those 
practitioners together to form a team. The practitioners represent agencies that have a 
stake in the solution of the challenge. The practitioners are brought together as subject 
matter experts on their aspect or interest in the issue. The goal is to form a team of 
experts where each expert represents a different discipline for the purpose of 
                                                 15 “The Collective Impact Framework | Collaboration for Impact.” 
16 World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), The Building Resilience 
against Violent Extremism (BRAVE) Model—A Collective Impact Initiative That Increases Public Safety 
and Social Cohesion, 16. 
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collaborating on complex challenges. One of the assumptions of the effort is that 
individual practitioners would not benefit from the expertise of team members from 
different disciplines if the team was not formed. The practitioners represent each of their 
disciplines and work to collaborate the efforts of their organizations with the partner 
agencies. The goal is to create a common plan to overcome a challenge and identify the 
role of each discipline. MDTs have been used in the United Stated for several decades, 
with a high level of success, in the area of physical and sexual child abuse. The MDT 
approach was first applied to child sexual abuse in the 1980s by the National Children’s 
Advocacy Center (NCAC) in Huntsville, Alabama.17 MDTs are currently used in 
Montgomery County to coordinate child abuse investigations.  
CVE programs should use structural models similar to CIIs and MDTs to 
facilitate the cooperation of stakeholders from different disciplines. A structure similar to 
a MDT is needed to manage the screening and service plan of persons receiving 
assistance in intervention programs. MDTs should be led by mental health practitioners 
who possess the training and experience needed to access and manage treatment properly. 
The teams should also include legal professionals and LE to manage the balance between 
successful treatment and public safety.  
                                                 17 “National Children’s Advocacy Center History,” accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.nationalcac. 
org/table/about/history/. 
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In Colorado, a seemingly normal and bright young girl was raised in a middle 
class suburb of Denver. The daughter of a Catholic college professor, she took honors 
courses at the local high school. She did not display troubling behavior, and enjoyed 
interacting with her friends. She was like any number of other American teenagers.  
In her junior year, the girl—Shannon—began wearing traditional Muslim 
clothing. See Figure 1. On her Facebook page, she changed her name from Shannon to 
Halima (Arabic for “gentle”). She began frequenting a Christian mega-church while 
wearing her traditional Muslim clothing.1 
 
Figure 1.  Shannon Conley.2 
                                                 1 Jenny Deam, “Colorado Woman’s Quest for Jihad Baffles Neighbors,” Latimes.com, July 25, 2014, 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-high-school-jihadi-20140726-story.html. 
2 Source: TheDenverChannel.com Team, “Shannon Conley, Arvada Teen Who Tried to Join ISIS to 
Wage Jihad, Sentenced to 4 Years in Prison,” 7NEWS, January 24, 2015, http://www.thedenverchannel. 
com/news/local-news/sentencing-for-shannon-conley-arvada-teen-who-tried-to-join-isis-to-wage-jihad. 
 2
Church officials approached the young woman and inquired if she had questions 
or was interested in joining the church; she replied that she was Muslim and was there to 
conduct research. Shortly thereafter, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was 
notified and conducted their first interview of Shannon Maureen Conley.3 
Nothing Conley was doing was illegal; but she was in the process of radicalizing 
to Islamic extremism. She had been watching DVDs of Anwar al-Awlaki and other 
jihadists.4 Conley met an Islamic State (IS) jihadist on-line, and agreed to travel to the 
Middle East to marry him and join him in waging jihad. She was also apparently pursuing 
military-style tactical training. Her parents, aware of her plans, were alarmed.  
The FBI interviewed Conley eight times over the course of five months. Six of the 
interviews were conducted with her parents present. Agents pleaded with Conley to 
abandon her radical views of Islam.5 The agents also beseeched her parents to dissuade 
her from committing any crimes or traveling to join a terror group. On April 8, 2014, 
shortly after the FBI’s last conversation with Conley, she was arrested at Denver 
International Airport, en route to Turkey and then Syria. Conley was charged federally 
with providing material support to a terrorist group.  
In January 2015, a federal judge sentenced Conley to four years in prison after she 
admitted to trying to travel to Syria to join the IS. The judge who sentenced her stated 
that he believed she needed psychiatric care, but also noted that she had remained defiant 
and possibly dangerous. “Added the judge, She has no history in the criminal justice 
system. She is very young…Teenagers make dumb decisions a lot.”6 At sentencing, 
Conley claimed that she had been wrong and now understood that Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) had corrupted Islam and the Quran. Prosecutors argued for the four-year 
sentence to dissuade others from taking a similar path.  
                                                 3 TheDenverChannel.com Team, “Shannon Conley, Arvada Teen Who Tried to Join ISIS to Wage 
Jihad, Sentenced to 4 Years in Prison.” 
4 Michael Martinez, Ana Cabrera, and Sara Weisfeldt, “Colorado Woman Gets 4 Years for Wanting to 
Join ISIS,” CNN, January 24, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/23/us/colorado-woman-isis-sentencing/ 
index.html. 
5 Deam, “Colorado Woman’s Quest for Jihad Baffles Neighbors.”  
6 Martinez, Cabrera, and Weisfeldt, “Colorado Woman Gets 4 Years for Wanting to Join ISIS.” 
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The greatest irony of the Shannon Conley case is that both her family and the FBI 
were aware of her activities and took steps to try and convince her from continuing on her 
path, and it was not enough. It is perfectly legal in the United States to be vulnerable to 
radicalization to violent extremism, to radicalize, or even to express radical beliefs. For 
this reason, authorities undertake investigative or prosecutorial activities only once a 
crime has been committed. The problem is not, in the first instance, that authorities fail to 
recognize or track would-be terrorists and their plans. Law enforcement (LE) and 
intelligence communities around the world are aware of individuals who pose a possible 
danger to society but who have not committed a crime, or at least a crime the government 
wished to prosecute. French officials, for example, were aware of the suspect brothers 
who committed the Charlie Hebdo attacks and murders in Paris in 2015. The government 
conducted surveillance, but the brothers were not observed committing any crimes, so the 
authorities turned their attention to other potentially violent suspects. It turned out that the 
brothers were planning mass murder, but they had not revealed any suspicious signs 
during the course of the government’s investigation.7 Similarly, the homegrown violent 
extremist (HVE) who committed murder at an Orlando nightclub had twice previously 
been investigated by the FBI.8 When the FBI exhausted all plausible investigative efforts, 
agents had no choice but to let this future killer go. The FBI and other federal LE 
agencies are restricted in their options in advance of a criminal act by a process that 
regulates their ability to open formal investigations, and limits the length of the 
investigation.  
As the threats of HVE have increasingly become a reality, the federal government 
has created a countering violent extremism (CVE) program to fill the pre-criminal space. 
Elements of the CVE program are designed to add the missing preventative pieces to 
traditional methods. The four main parts of the U.S. CVE design are community 
engagement, education on radicalization, counter narratives, and intervention programs 
                                                 7 Scott Bronstein, “Cherif and Said Kouachi: Their Path to Terror,” CNN, January 14, 2015, http:// 
www.cnn.com/2015/01/13/world/kouachi-brothers-radicalization/index.html. 
8 Del Quentin Wilber, “The FBI Investigated the Orlando Mass Shooter for 10 Months—and Found 
Nothing. Here’s Why,” Latimes.com, July 14, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-fbi-investigation-
mateen-20160712-snap-story.html. 
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designed to deter or re-direct individuals from a path to radicalization. These parts are the 
same basic components of the most successful precursor models, namely gang diversion9 
and substance abuse diversion programs.10 
LE plays an integral role in CVE, but the effort also relies heavily on other 
participants and stakeholders. Mental health practitioners must play a critical role in both 
the intervention and education segments of CVE by providing essential services, 
detecting those at risk, and educating others on the radicalization process. While LE and 
mental health practitioners represent two professions dedicated to helping others, a 
mutual understanding or cooperation has historically been lacking.11 LE is frequently a 
profession charged with gathering information, and the field of mental health is generally 
a profession ethically and legally bound to protect the confidentiality of its patients. This 
conflict of perceived interests and obligations has slowed meaningful collaboration in the 
CVE intervention realm.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can mental health providers treat or divert individuals from the path to 
radicalization but still share risk assessments and intelligence with LE when patients pose 
a threat to others? CVE programs involved in intervention and diversion need a 
mechanism or policy in place that facilitates the notification of LE authorities when a 
diversion practitioner suspects that the client is not responding to diversion efforts or a 
determination is made that the individual presents a risk to others. What should such a 
policy comprise?  
                                                 9 James C. Howell, “Gang Prevention: An Overview of Research and Programs. Juvenile Justice 
Bulletin,” Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2010, 12, http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED518 
416.  
10 Jason Payne, Max Kwiatkowski, and Joy Wundersitz, Police Drug Diversion: A Study of Criminal 
Offending Outcomes, Research and Public Policy Series, no. 97 (Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 2008), xi. 
11 James R. Corbin, “Confidentiality & the Duty to Warn: Ethical and Legal Implications for the 
Therapeutic Relationship,” The New Social Worker, 1, April 23, 2014, http://www.socialworker.com/api/ 
content/f6758dd1-7700-3ccb-95ab-96de65ea6fcd/ 
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B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The United States has adopted CVE as a preventative aspect of its 
counterterrorism strategy. In 2011, the U.S. government issued a report titled, 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.12 The 
report documents the government’s position that traditional efforts, including diplomatic 
relations, military action, intelligence gathering and analysis, and investigative and 
prosecutorial processes, were deemed insufficient in preventing and deterring HVEs in 
the homeland.13 CVE programs are focused on building trusting relationships between 
the government and the communities they serve, training practitioners and community 
members on radicalization and terrorism, countering the narratives of violent jihad, 
providing an deflection or diversion application to redirect individuals at-risk or engaged 
in the radicalization process, and providing an intervention element to assist individuals 
who may be at risk for radicalization.14 
1. Intervention, Deflection, and Diversion 
George Washington University Professor Dr. Lorenzo Vidino divides the 
categories of radicalization into two parts. According to Vidino: 
Cognitive radicalization is the process through which an individual adopts 
ideas that are severely at odds with those of the mainstream, refutes the 
legitimacy of the existing social order, and seeks to replace it with a new 
structure based on a completely different belief system. Violent 
radicalization occurs when an individual takes the additional step of using 
violence to further the views derived from cognitive radicalization.15 
                                                 12 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President of the United 
States, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf. 
13 Ibid., 2. 
14 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Strategic Implementation Plan for 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (Washington, DC: 
Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/sip-final.pdf. 
15 Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon, Countering Radicalization in Europe (London: International 
Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, 2012), 9–10.  
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Vidino’s assertion describes the difference between an individual who is radicalized and 
an individual who is radicalized and involved in illegal or violent activities.  
Intervention programs are designed to provide services for individuals who are 
vulnerable to radicalization; these people might be immigrants who are having a hard 
time adjusting to a new culture, or teenagers experiencing social difficulties. Deflection 
and diversion programs are designed for individuals involved in the radicalization 
process. Diversion programs are designed to be in lieu of incarceration after or during a 
prosecution. Deflection programs are used “when a law enforcement agency is aware of 
the subject but instead of prosecution or before a crime is committed, the individual is 
referred to an intervention program.”16 
According to the strategic plan issued by the World Organization for Resource 
Development and Education (WORDE) for the Building Resilience Against Violent 
Extremism model of CVE: 
Both diversion and deflection programs attempt to divert or channel 
offenders away from the justice system by providing intense wrap-around 
services, including counseling, mentoring, case management, and 
community service opportunities. Such programs are often conducted in 
partnership with police departments, courts, district attorneys, or non-
governmental agencies in lieu of incarceration or prosecution and often 
require reporting compliance to the referring agency.17 
For the purpose of this thesis, collectively, all three are referred to as 
“intervention.” “Intervention efforts are typically provided by trained, experienced, and 
licensed mental health practitioners. These experts include social workers, clinicians, 
                                                 16 World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), The Building Resilience 
against Violent Extremism (BRAVE) Model—A Collective Impact Initiative That Increases Public Safety 
and Social Cohesion (Montgomery Village, MD: World Organization for Resource Development and 




therapists, psychiatrists, and psychologists. (Referrals for intervention also come from the 
community and government.)”18 
Clinicians and therapists involved in intervention efforts are bound by ethical and 
legal obligations to maintain the confidentiality of the persons they are treating.19 As a 
result, legal restrictions may be in place prohibiting or mandating the notification of LE. 
On the other hand, a situation may emerge in which the therapists may be assessing a 
client who has been referred for intervention without recognizing clues that may indicate 
that the client poses a risk to the rest of society. In such a scenario, communication 
between diversion and intervention practitioners and LE sources may be crucial.  
2. Medical Record Confidentiality 
Practitioners may be affected and limited in their ability to disclose client or 
patient information by federal HIPAA laws and state statutes directed towards medical 
record confidentiality.20 HIPAA and state laws were created to protect patients’ privacy 
rights, but they also provide for exceptions to fulfill crucial LE and public health 
functions. Some of the exceptions to confidentiality and privacy laws include responses 
                                                 18 The community referrals may come from “bystanders,” defined as individuals who are close, or in 
contact with, an individual who is at risk or engaged in a radicalization process. See Thomas Schillinger, 
“Bystander Effect and Religious Group Affiliation: Terrorism and the Diffusion of Responsibility” (PhD 
diss., Walden University, 2014), http://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/126/.Bystanders may be 
family members, friends, co-workers, religious associates, or neighbors. When bystanders make a referral 
to a CVE for diversion, the presence and identity of the individual referred may, or may not, be known to 
government authorities. Mechanisms and processes may not be in place to facilitate notification of LE 
when the referred individual presents a threat. Examples of intervention referrals originating from 
government sources are court referrals, juvenile justice systems referrals, referrals from LE (i.e., a referral 
from a school resource officer), referrals from Health and Human Services agencies, referrals from schools, 
and referrals directly from terrorism investigative agencies, such as the FBI and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTF).Typically, in cases where the referral originates from an investigative agency, an 
investigation has been conducted and a determination has been made that no charges or prosecution will 
take place at the time of the referral. This finding does not ensure that the target of the investigation does 
not pose a risk, that the investigation will not continue, or that charges will not be placed in the future. 
19 Corbin, “Confidentiality & the Duty to Warn: Ethical and Legal Implications for the Therapeutic 
Relationship.”  
20 “When Does the Privacy Rule Allow Covered Entities to Disclose Protected Health Information to 
Law Enforcement Officials?,” accessed September 19, 2015, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq/ 
disclosures_for_law_enforcement_purposes/505.html. 
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to court orders, mandated reporting of sexual or physical abuse, and notification of when 
a patient dies.21 
Various federal laws define the government’s role and responsibilities in regards 
to national security (i.e., the National Security Act and the Patriot Act). These laws define 
terms and delineate the circumstances in which a practitioner may report behavior that 
endangers national security.22 For example, Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act describes 
the process through which the federal government may require practitioners to provide 
the FBI with evidence of national intelligence, counter-intelligence, or national security 
implications.23 
3. Confidentiality versus Public Peril 
State laws inspired by the 1974 and 1976 Tarasoff vs. Regents case in California 
affect clinicians and their duty to warn or protect when they are treating a client who 
poses a risk to others.24 It is from the Tarasoff case that the terms “duty to warn” and 
“duty to protect” originate.25 Tarasoff was the first case to explore the balance between a 
patient’s right to confidentiality and a therapist’s obligation to warn third parties of 
potential danger posed by the client.26 The requirement, which has been adopted and 
applied by most states, requires that psychotherapists with information that a client they 
are treating poses a threat to someone else make reasonable efforts to communicate with 
                                                 21 “When Does the Privacy Rule Allow Covered Entities to Disclose Protected Health Information to 
Law Enforcement Officials?.” 
22 F. Sensenbrenner, “H.R.2048—114th Congress (2015–2016): USA FREEDOM Act of 2015,” June 
2, 2015, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2048/text. 
23 “National Security and Medical Information,” accessed March 26, 2016, https://www.eff.org/ 
issues/national-security-and-medical-information. 
24 Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976). 
25 Steven Granich, “Duty to Warn, Duty to Protect,” SocialWorker.com, accessed February 27, 2016, 
http://www.socialworker.com/api/content/a89ea5ac-f455-31d0-b88f-d814ca06299f/. 
26 Damon Muir Walcott, Pat Cerundolo, and James C. Beck, “Current Analysis of the Tarasoff Duty: 
An Evolution towards the Limitation of the Duty to Protect,” Behavioral Sciences & the Law 19, no. 3 
(June 2001): 325–43, doi:10.1002/bsl.444. 
 9
and warn the victim and a LE agency.27 Since duty to warn and protect laws reside at the 
state level, each state has a unique law that applies the duty differently.  
C. HYPOTHESIS 
CVE intervention, deflection, and diversion programs need mental health 
practitioners to conduct an assessment, construct a treatment plan, and provide treatment. 
The effort needs to be coordinated among professionals from various fields. 
Relationships and communication between the professionals are critical. The solution 
includes an understanding of the laws that facilitate or restrict disclosure of confidential 
health information combined with structured teams to oversee the process.  
In Montgomery County, Maryland, detectives assigned to the County Police 
Department’s Special Victim Investigative Division Child Abuse Units work hand in 
hand with social workers from the County’s Child Protective Services division. The 
detectives and social workers conduct joint investigations into the reports of physical and 
sexual child abuse. In some cases, where the victim is younger, the specially trained 
social workers conduct the interview of the victim. The social workers and detectives are 
also part of a larger team of practitioners who all have an interest in the investigation and 
coordination of services to the victims and their families. The larger team includes 
specially trained medical personnel (pediatrician and nurse), prosecutors from the state’s 
attorney’s office, and lawyers from the county attorney’s office. The team meets once a 
week (as needed) to collaborate on cases that need special attention. The meetings, called 
“multi-d’s,” are the formal collaborative efforts of an entire multi-disciplinary team. 
Members, who have identified an issue, or problem, call the meeting to bring together the 
collective expertise of the members to solve any issues. During the meeting, members 
work together to identify issues and create solutions. Over the years, the members of the 
teams have developed a strong working relationship, which has led to an understanding 
and appreciation for the roles of the other members of the team.  
                                                 27 Bonnie R. Benitez, “Confidentiality and Its Exceptions (including the U.S. Patriot Act),” The 
Therapist 16, no. 4 (2004): 32–36. 
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Collaborative efforts designed to address complex issues frequently organize into 
structures that have proven to overcome challenges. CIIs and multi-disciplinary teams 
(MDTs) are two examples of such structures. Each model was designed to bring together 
practitioners from different disciplines to accomplish a shared goal. The structures 
facilitate a mutual understanding of roles and ensure communication and cooperation 
between the different elements of the group, thus ensuring a higher probability of 
success. CIIs are best deployed at the organization level, and MDTs are best utilized at 
the sub-group level. CVE programs should analyze the concepts inherent in both 
programs. CVE programs may benefit from the structure of a CII. Smaller working 
groups, such as those managing and facilitating intervention efforts, should operate as a 
MDT. The collaborative group and the tenets of the structure should then be used to 
ensure proper training on laws and policies applicable to the overall missions of the 
program.  
Although the response to child abuse and radicalization are different, it is possible 
to apply methods that have proven successful to CVE. CIIs and MDTs may be used to 
identify and solidify roles, create trusting partnerships, study policy, and manage the 
screening and creation of treatment plans for clients in CVE intervention programs. The 
use of a MDT to oversee efforts would ensure that all members of the team were 
educated on the laws that apply to the effort, and that proper communication between 
team members occurred. The strength of the model lies in the melting together of 
different disciplines that all have a role in the effort.  
Once practitioners have formed into CIIs and MDTs, the identification and 
execution of roles and responsibilities may begin. Legal experts may begin determining 
the path forward and policies may be constructed. As the effort progresses and additional 
issues arise, a team of experts would already exist to analyze and address the issues.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The U.S. CVE program was designed to apply to local levels of government with 
the support of the federal government. The main goal of the program is to “prevent 
violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or 
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recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence.”28 In 
locations where CVE programs exist, not all aspects of the program have been 
implemented. As a result, a fair amount of research has been conducted on CVE in 
general, but little current research is available on CVE programs presently in place, and 
specifically, no research on CVE intervention or diversion programs. The lack of metrics 
associated with measuring the success of CVE programs, and the need for continuous 
studies on CVE efforts have been raised by researchers.29 
As threats against the homeland develop, the response to those threats evolves. As 
a result, the landscape is constantly changing. This literature review is divided into the 
following categories: 
 The U.S. CVE program 
 Current CVE models 
 National security laws and confidentiality 
 The multidisciplinary approach 
1. U.S. CVE Program 
The 2011 federal government report titled, Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, defines violent extremists as “individuals 
who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals.”30 The 
report identifies the central goal of CVE as “prevent[ing] violent extremists and their 
supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in 
the United States to commit acts of violence.”31 
                                                 28 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States. 
29 NaureenChowdhury Fink, Peter Romaniuk, and RafiaBarakat, Evaluating Countering Violent 
Extremism Programming: Practice and Progress (New York: Center on Global Counterterrorism 
Cooperation, 2013), http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Fink_Romaniuk_Barakat_ 
EVALUATING-CVE-PROGRAMMING_20132.pdf. 
30 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States, 1. 
31 Ibid., 3. 
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Several months later, the federal government issued a second report, titled, The 
Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States.32 The SIP identified a three-part strategy to implement 
CVE programs as increasing support for local communities, expanding governmental 
knowledge, and providing counter-narratives.33 These two reports provide a roadmap of 
the federal government’s intent for its CVE program. These types of reports issued 
directly by the federal government are primary sources; the remaining, secondary 
literature, provides an analysis and evaluation of the plans.  
Many of the sources that provide an analysis of the federal CVE program have 
come to similar conclusions and have identified similar criticisms, or areas of interest in 
which lie opportunities for improvement. The fact that different experts who represent a 
variety of organizations have drawn the same conclusions may lend a certain amount of 
credibility to the findings. For example, a report issued by the federal Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) and a report issued by the Heritage Foundation both recognized 
that the federal government had not selected a lead agency for the implementation and 
management of CVE, and that it was an area of concern that needed to be addressed.34 In 
this case, both a federal agency and a non-governmental organization (NGO) arrived at 
the same conclusion in regards to CVE. Since then, the federal government has 
consolidated many of its efforts under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Other federal agencies, such as the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office, are still involved 
in different areas.  
Virtually all the research on CVE identifies problem areas within the model and 
its implementation: a lack of funding, an absence of a lead agency, the lack of a clear 
definition for CVE, hurdles associated with community engagement and trust, the 
                                                 32 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Strategic Implementation Plan for 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 2011. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Jerome P. Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States (CRS Report No. R42553) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc 
87235/m1/1/high_res_d/R42553_2012May31.pdf; David Inserra, “Revisiting Efforts to Counter Violent 
Extremism: Leadership Needed,” The Heritage Foundation, April 20, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/ 
research/reports/2015/04/revisiting-efforts-to-counter-violent-extremism-leadership-needed. 
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stigmatization of the Muslim community, a lack of effort aimed at other populations 
vulnerable to radicalization, and a lack of empirical research to provide policy makers 
with information for decision making.  
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has experienced acts of violence 
committed by individuals who have been radicalized to violent extremism. According to 
a report issued by the CRS, an estimated 63 homegrown violent jihadist plots or attacks 
have occurred in the United States between September 11, 2001 and 2013.35 
Many of the individuals who committed these acts were considered HVEs who 
had undergone a radicalization process. According to Bjelopera, “‘homegrown’ is the 
term that describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or 
abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely 
within the United States.”36 
In this context, radicalization refers to the process in which an individual acquires 
and internalizes extremist or jihadist beliefs.37 Experts agree that the process of 
radicalization may contain some similarities for some individuals, but that currently no 
solid pattern exists since it is an individualized event. The process may be affected by 
outside influences, such as intermediaries, social networks, the Internet, or contact with 
others in prison.38 Even though the radicalization process is unique to each individual, 
case studies are beneficial to identifying markers displayed by other individuals in the 
process of radicalizing.  
“The term ‘jihadist’,” notes Bjelopera, “describes radicalized individuals using 
Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment 
of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction government by a Muslim civil and religious leader 
                                                 35 Jerome Bjelopera, American Jihadist: Terrorism Combating a Complex Threat (CRS Report No. 




38 Ibid., 2. 
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known as a caliph.”39 The federal government defines violent extremists as “individuals 
who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals.”40 
Examples of terror acts committed by homegrown individuals who had radicalized to 
extremist violence include the Fort Hood shooting and the Boston Marathon bombing.41 
Historically, the government’s response to terrorist acts committed or planned on 
U.S. soil has involved traditional LE and intelligence activities. These activities include 
gathering and analyzing information, traditional investigative techniques, and 
prosecutions. These efforts are conducted by LE and intelligence agencies at the federal, 
state, and local levels. According to a 2010 report by the RAND Corporation: 
Traditional law enforcement, in which authorities attempt to identify and 
apprehend a perpetrator after a crime has been committed, is inadequate to 
deal with terrorists who are determined to cause many deaths and great 
destruction and who may not care whether they themselves survive. Public 
safety demands a more preventative approach, intervention before an 
attack occurs.42 
In October 2016, the U.S. government released an updated SIP, which addresses 
many of the broad criticisms of the CVE program.43 The 2016 SIP re-enforces the goals 
of CVE programs, and states, “The overall goal of the Strategy and United States 
Government efforts to implement it remains unchanged: to prevent violent extremists and 
their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups 
                                                 39 Ibid., 1. 
40 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States, 1. 
41 For more information on these events, please refer to Joseph Lieberman and Susan Collins, A 
Ticking Time Bomb Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government’s Failure to Prevent the Fort 
Hood Attack (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
2011), http://fas.org/irp/congress/2011_rpt/hsgac-hood.pdf; “Boston Marathon Bombings,” accessed July 8, 
2015, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/specials/boston_marathon_bombing/. 
42 Brian Michael Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the 
United States since September 11, 2001(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), viii, http://www.rand.org/ 
content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP292.pdf.  
43 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Strategic Implementation Plan for 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (Washington, DC: 
Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/docs/2016_strategic_implementation_plan_empowering_local_partners_prev.pdf. 
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in the United States to commit acts of violence.”44 The current SIP also recognizes that 
no single path to radicalization is followed and the phenomenon is not exclusive to any 
one population, religion, or cause. The introduction to the current SIP also provides 
clarity to the term “stakeholder” in relation to CVE programs. The document describes 
stakeholders as persons who have an “expressed or identified role” in CVE and may 
include LE, members of the public, NGOs, researchers, members of the education field, 
mental health practitioners, and efforts provided by private-sector experts.45 
The new SIP addresses previous criticism of the federal CVE model’s lack of a 
lead agency by assigning a DHS task force as the lead government agency in 
coordinating research and the dissemination of information. “Its work is organized into 
four lines of effort: Research and Analysis; Engagement and Technical Assistance; 
Interventions; and Communications and Digital Strategy.”46 
The current SIP identified intervention as one of the four areas of concentration 
for the DHS task force. The document states that the task force, “will coordinate the 
development and dissemination of resources describing possible warning signs as well as 
steps families and friends can take if they believe someone close to them is becoming 
recruited or radicalized to violence.”47 
Counter-radicalization programs are typically divided into three different types of 
efforts: prevention (intervention), disengagement (deflection), and de-radicalization 
(diversion). Prevention involves education and counter-narrative efforts designed to stop 
the radicalization process before it begins. These efforts may involve an intervention 
aspect for individuals who have been referred to a program after a determination has been 
made that the individual may be vulnerable or susceptible to a radicalization process. 
Disengagement or deflective efforts are designed to provide an “off ramp” for individuals 
engaged in a radicalization process. De-radicalization or diversion programs are designed 
                                                 44 Ibid., 1.  
45 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States, 1. 
46 Ibid., 2. 
47 Ibid., 11. 
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to lead a radicalized individual to abandon violent or deviant views and return to regular 
society. A successful outcome of disengagement and de-radicalization activities may 
include an individual maintaining radical views, but abandoning violent activities.48 All 
these activities and phases fall under the general rubric of “intervention.” 
2. Current CVE Models 
Several years after the U.S. government began planning a CVE program, efforts 
stalled. After the Boston Marathon Bombing and the rise of the IS, interest in the 
program was renewed.49 Former Attorney General Eric Holder announced in September 
2014 that CVE efforts would be focused on three cites, which were identified as Boston, 
Los Angeles, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. The “Three City Pilot” effort tasked authorities 
in those cities with developing local CVE programs targeting IS-related radicalization.50 
The three pilot cites were chosen by the federal government based on their “existing 
achievements with community engagement.”51 A fourth program was developed in 
Montgomery County, Maryland, by a NGO in partnership with local government.  
A search for literature on the four models yields primary source information 
released by various stakeholder panels enacted by the local jurisdictions to create and 
implement the CVE models. For example, Boston and Los Angeles both released 
documents, referred to as “frameworks,” outlining their plans for the creation and 
implementation of their CVE models.52 The frameworks clearly describe the intended 
                                                 48 Lorenzo Vidino, Countering Radicalization in America (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace, 2010), 2, http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31361/1/SP%20262-%20Counter 
ing%20%20Radicalization%20in%20America.pdf. 
49 Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, Countering Violent Extremism in America (Washington, DC: 
Center for Cyber and Homeland Security: The George Washington University, 2015), https://cchs.gwu.edu/ 
sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/CVE%20in%20America%20.pdf. 
50 “Pilot Programs Are Key to Our Countering Violent Extremism Efforts,” February 18, 2015, 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/pilot-programs-are-key-our-countering-violent-extremism-efforts. 
51 Ibid. 
52 U.S. Attorney’s Office District of Massachusetts, A Framework for Prevention and Intervention 
Strategies: Boston CVE Framework (Boston: U.S. Attorney’s Office District of Massachusetts, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ma/pages/attachments/2015/02/18/framework.pdf; Los 
Angeles Interagency Coordination Group, Los Angeles Framework for CVE-Full Report (Los Angeles: Los 
Angeles Interagency Coordination Group, 2005), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Los% 
20Angeles%20Framework%20for%20CVE-Full%20Report.pdf. 
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parts of the models and identified their goals. Several fact sheets on the pilot cities’ CVE 
programs were issued by the federal government. The Minneapolis-St. Paul team did not 
issue a framework document, but a fact sheet does exist.53 Additionally, numerous 
articles from media sources are available on the pilot cities programs, but the majority of 
the information is taken from the releases provided by the programs themselves. The 
fourth program, located in Montgomery County, Maryland, and known as the 
Montgomery County Model (MCM), has also released information on its program, which 
identifies the parts and goals of the program. Recently, the MCM has expanded to other 
jurisdictions. As a result, the name of the program has changed to Building Resilience 
Against Violent Extremism (BRAVE). In the summer of 2016, BRAVE released a three-
year strategic plan outlining recommendations and future growth.54 
The MCM of CVE is the first community based and led CVE model in the 
country. The model was developed by the WORDE, which is a NGO. According to 
WORDE’s director, Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi, the MCM was designed to be a community-
led, public-private partnership rooted in interfaith collaboration.55 WORDE has partnered 
with the Montgomery County Police (MCP) Department and the Montgomery County 
Executive’s Office of Community Partnerships. The MCM is tied to the Office of 
Community Partnerships’ Faith Community Working Group (FCWG). The FCWG is 
composed of faith-based community leaders, the MCP, trauma-informed counselors, 
youth activists, and violence prevention experts. “The success of the program relies on a 
trusting relationship among local police, schools, health and human services agencies, 
and the faith community, whereby persons, who may be radicalized, regardless of the 
                                                 53 United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis-St Paul Building Community Resilience Program-
Pilot Fact Sheet (Minneapolis, MN: United States Attorney’s Office, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/publications/Minneapolis-St%20Paul%20Building%20Community%20Resilience%20 
Program-Pilot%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. 
54 World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), The Building Resilience 
against Violent Extremism (BRAVE) Model—A Collective Impact Initiative That Increases Public Safety 
and Social Cohesion. 
55 George J. Selim et al., “New Strategies for Countering Homegrown Violent Extremism,” The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 21, 2013, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/new-strategies-for-countering-homegrown-violent-extremism. 
 18
reason, are identified as possibly benefitting from an intervention.”56 The goal of the 
MCM is to educate the public and governmental organizations on the risk factors 
associated with violent extremism, and then to refer the appropriate resources to 
intervene with the at-risk individuals before they progress down a path to radicalized 
violence.57 
Studies on the different CVE models are being conducted by such institutions as 
the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), 
and one study of the Minneapolis/St. Paul model is being conducted by the University of 
Southern California.58 It is expected that the studies will provide additional information 
on the differences between the programs, and assist in identifying any strengths and 
weaknesses of the different programs.  
3. National Security Laws and Confidentiality 
Governments in democratic countries have an obligation to protect themselves, 
their citizens, and their interests. Federal laws, such as the National Intelligence Act and 
the PATRIOT Act (and since 2015, its successor, the USA FREEDOM Act) spell out the 
U.S. government’s responsibility and authority.59 The structure of these laws ensures that 
protective efforts remain balanced with the protection of civil liberties, “The governments 
of free societies charged with fighting a rising tide of terrorism are thus faced with a 
democratic dilemma: If they do not fight terrorism with the means available to them, they 
endanger their citizenry; if they do, they appear to endanger the very freedoms which 
                                                 56 Hedieh Mirahmadi, “An Innovative Approach to Countering Violent Extremism,” The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, October 9, 2013, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/ 
an-innovative-approach-to-countering-violent-extremism1. 
57 “The Montgomery County Model,” accessed July 27, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/Montgomery%20County%20MD%20Community%20Partnership%20Model-WORDE%20 
Report.pdf. 
58 National Center of Excellence for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE), 
Foreign Fighters: Terrorist Recruitment and Countering Violent Extremism in Minneapolis-St. Paul (Los 
Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, 2015), http://securitydebrief.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/04/Foreign-Fighters-Terrorist-Recruitment-and-CVE-in-Minneapolis-St-Paul.pdf. 
59 National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. 401, 1947, https://www.ncsc.gov/training/resources/ 
nsaact1947.pdf; Lou Ann Wiedemann, “Homeland Security Act, Patriot Act, Freedom of Information Act, 
and HIM (2010 Update),” Journal of AHIMA, November 2010, http://bok.ahima.org/doc?oid=106172. 
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they are charged to protect.”60 This balance has sometimes been described as a pendulum 
that swings toward security in times of danger, and then back towards civil liberties and 
increased freedom during times of peace, “Thus it seems that the democracies are 
destined to wander to and fro between the poles of too much liberty and too extensive a 
security effort, walking the fine line between security and freedom.”61 An argument can 
be made that freedom is not possible under threatening conditions. A counter argument 
may be made that freedom trumps all. Balancing and ensuring both is the responsibility 
of the government and the people. Free speech, a free press, courts, and elections are all 
part of the balancing process. Laws, and granting power to government agencies, provide 
the counterbalance.  
After WWII, and at the beginning of the Cold War, the U.S. government enacted 
the National Security Act, which called for a major re-organization of the military and 
intelligence community.62 The Act defines intelligence as all information that involves 
threats to the country, its citizens, property, or interests. Intelligence is also defined as 
anything having to do with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or any other 
matter affecting U.S. national or homeland security. The use of the term homeland 
security seems like a newer phenomenon, but it was actually used in this sweeping 
legislation in 1947. The National Security Act begins to define authority and 
responsibility in reference to intelligence issues. Executive Orders (EOs) are legal entities 
that describe how other laws will be applied to various entities within the government.  
In addition to the major re-structuring of government, and the creation of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Act laid the groundwork for the 
government’s framework for providing today’s national security efforts and a base upon 
which future laws would be built. EO 12333, issued by President Ronald Reagan, is good 
                                                 60 Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and 
International Terrorism, 2001st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1995), 67. 
61 Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International 
Terrorism, 99. 
62 “Truman Signs the National Security Act–Jul 26, 1947,” accessed August 14, 2016, http://www. 
history.com/this-day-in-history/truman-signs-the-national-security-act. 
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example of a legal action building upon the National Security Act.63 The EO defines and 
relegates the duty of civilian intelligence and counter-intelligence responsibilities in the 
homeland to the FBI. The EO also affirms the government’s right to collect and use 
intelligence on U.S. persons, and mandates that the methods be the least intrusive as 
possible. It also delegates the oversight process to various entities within the government.  
In short, the National Security Act and the EO, which clarifies roles and methods, 
provides the U.S. government with the authority to protect the country, its citizens, and 
interests by collecting and using intelligence. A separation of powers was developed in 
which normal intelligence agencies are aimed outside of the United States, and the FBI is 
relegated with the authority as a civilian LE agency to conduct protective investigations 
on U.S. soil, although the reach of the FBI extends oversees.  
The PATRIOT Act is another example of sweeping legislation in response to a 
major national security event.64 The Act was the largest re-organization of this nation’s 
federal government since the National Security Act. The expedited creation of the Act 
and the scope of its change are both notable. In addition to a large scale re-organization 
and the creation of the DHS, it is also important to recognize that the Act is aimed 
directly at terrorism targeting the U.S. homeland. As a result, the Act both focuses and 
increases the government’s ability to collect, use, and store intelligence.  
Some of the authority vested in the government by the Act has created 
controversy. Some of this controversy has bled over into the realm of CVE. Specifically, 
Section 215 of the Patriot Act has received a significant amount of criticism for the broad 
power it granted the government in collecting data on U.S. citizens.65 Much of the debate 
has surrounded the ability the section granted the National Security Agency to monitor 
and collect electronic data. The public response to this aspect of the Act has been used by 
some to fuel discontent in other areas.  
                                                 63 “Executive Order 12333—United States Intelligence Activities,” accessed August 15, 2016, http:// 
www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html. 
64 “What Is the USA Patriot Act: Preserving Life and Liberty,” accessed August 20, 2016, https:// 
www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm. 
65 “Law Enforcement & National Security Access to Medical Records,” July 11, 2013, https://cdt.org/ 
insight/law-enforcement-national-security-access-to-medical-records/. 
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Some of the literature used for this thesis connects the government’s collection of 
data to confidential personal information in the field of psychotherapy.66 According to a 
2004 article from The Therapist, concern has arisen within the field of psychotherapy that 
the PATRIOT Act, in particular Section 215, grants the government carte blanche to 
collect personal health information (PHI). Expressly, claims have been made that the 
section allows the FBI to require therapists to turn over “books, records, papers, 
documents, and other items,” while at the same time, prohibiting the therapist from 
advising the patient that the government was seeking or obtaining the information.67 
These claims are technically true, but not at all a new development. The FBI and other 
LE agencies have always been able to collect information as part of criminal 
investigations.  
The law has always had checks and balances and provided oversight for the 
process. Investigators must possess a certain level of proof (probable cause), articulate 
the proof in a sworn document (search warrant), and receive approval from a judge 
(oversight) to seize information (or anything else of an evidentiary nature). None of these 
legal requirements are new, expanded, or out of the ordinary. It should also be noted that 
the Act does not require mandatory notification of the government by therapists, or 
anyone else.  
One point of possible concern is Section 215, and the collection of information. 
Section 215 makes changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which 
allows for the FBI director, or designee, to apply for a court order to seize PHI through 
the Foreign Intelligence Court (FISC).68 While the FISC provides the same oversight 
over 4th Amendment search and seizure issues as regular courts and magistrates, it adds a 
layer of secrecy to the proceedings. The secret nature of the FISC was necessary due to 
the court’s original purpose as an oversight of foreign intelligence investigations. The 
court serves as a balance of oversight and secrecy to protect the integrity of counter-
                                                 66 Benitez, “Confidentiality and Its Exceptions (Including the U.S. Patriot Act),” 32–36. 
67 “FAQ on Government Access to Medical Records,” accessed August 15, 2016, https://www. 
aclu.org/faq-government-access-medical-records. 
68 “Law Enforcement & National Security Access to Medical Records.” 
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intelligence investigations. The expansion of the use of the FISC for counter-terrorism 
investigations serves the same purposes. While the oversight remains the same, it is more 
difficult to shine the light of public oversight to FISC proceedings. “As the law stands 
now, the federal government has multiple avenues for accessing medical records by 
citing national security considerations, and gag provisions in the Patriot Act make it 
difficult to know how this power is being used.”69 
The bottom line is that Section 215 of the Patriot Act expands the use of the FISC 
to include investigations of domestic terrorism.70 The use of the court retains the same 
level of judicial oversight (perhaps more) as other judicial venues used by government 
investigators to have search and seizure warrants issued. Additionally, the nature of the 
system has not changed in reference to the ability for the federal government to use 
Section 215 for a “fishing expedition.”71 The opportunity does not exist. If a CVE 
practitioner is served with a search and seizure warrant or court order ordering the release 
of PHI, it is in relation to an investigation of a serious national threat. If the CVE 
practitioner has not provided the government with the information that was used to open 
the investigation, and the government developed probable cause from sources not related 
to the CVE practitioner, the practitioner has no choice but to comply with the warrant.  
4. Multi-Disciplinary Teams 
For many years, different fields have relied on multidisciplinary efforts to find the 
best approach to shared goals. MDTs are typically composed of a group of professionals 
from different fields who share a common purpose, but contribute different areas of 
expertise to the effort.72 By this definition, CVE efforts are already a form of MDT. This 
thesis studies the expansion of the use of the MDT model to improve cooperation and 
communication with an increased set of practitioners involved in CVE. Since MDTs have 
existed for several decades and been used in multiple fields, sufficient information exists 
                                                 69 “National Security and Medical Information.” 
70 “Law Enforcement & National Security Access to Medical Records.” 
71 “FAQ on Government Access to Medical Records.” 
72 The Free Dictionary, s.v. “Multidisciplinary Team,” accessed July 11, 2016, http://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/multidisciplinary+team. 
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on their history and use. MDTs have previously been successfully used to address 
complex issues. Some of the areas where MDTs have been applied (such as child abuse 
investigations) involve many of the same professionals involved in CVE intervention 
programs.73 As a result, the focus is on the use of MDT in response to reports of child 
abuse with comparisons made to the adoption of the use to CVE in an expanded capacity.  
The FBI has suggested its own version of an MDT in the form of shared 
responsibility committees (SCRs).74 The federal government has been vague in the 
information released concerning SRCs; however, the public response from certain areas 
has been swift and strong. Few official sources are available that document the 
government’s intent or use of SRCs, while ample secondary sources exist criticizing the 
proposed program.75 Research for this thesis provides an analysis of what is known about 
the SRCs, a comparison to other MDT processes, and a recommendation on how to move 
forward. 
5. Summary 
The threat to the United States represented by HVEs is constantly evolving partly 
because of the pace of changes in other parts of the world. For example, IS currently is 
considered one of the greatest terror threats, yet did not exist just several years ago. As 
conditions around the world change and evolve, the threat in the U.S. homeland continues 
to transform. The fast pace at which technology progresses affects how terror groups 
plan, recruit, communicate, and attack.  
In response, efforts to counter violent extremism may be advancing faster than 
studies and research on the policies and programs can be completed. The use of CVE in 
the United States has been researched for several years, but models of the program have 
only begun to be implemented as of 2016. Studies of the models have recently been 
                                                 73“Multidisciplinary Team,” accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.nationalcac.org/about/multi-team.html. 
74 Murtaza Hussain and Jenna McLaughlin, “FBI’s ‘Shared Responsibility Committees’ to Identify 
‘Radicalized’ Muslims Raise Alarms,” The Intercept, April 9, 2016, https://theintercept.com/2016/04/ 
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29, 2016, http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/278223-key-dem-wants-watchdog-to-probe-fbi. 
 24
conducted by such groups as the NIJ and PERF. Research on foreign programs is 
abundant, but is not the focus of this thesis because U.S. laws are different and unique 
from other countries.  
Sufficient information exists to analyze CVE models, intervention or diversion, 
and to conduct a legal analysis of the laws that affect the topics of confidentiality, duty to 
warn, and the notification of the proper authorities by CVE practitioners when they 
determine a threat or possible threat exists.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The thesis analyzed the two major legal areas that affect CVE intervention, 
diversion, and deflection (medical record confidentiality and the duty to warn or protect) 
and how they facilitate or restrict practitioners from making notification to authorities 
concerning clients who remain or become a threat. This portion of the thesis takes the 
form of a legal analysis that determines the meaning of the cases and their respective 
implications.  
The goal of the thesis is to define and explain the space in which diversion and 
intervention practitioners must operate in terms of the ability and requirements related to 
their duty to warn, confidentiality, and national security exceptions. The output from the 
thesis is a set of structural recommendations to facilitate intervention efforts by 
integrating or leveraging organizational models already in use.  
CVE practitioners will need to be knowledgeable in medical confidentiality laws 
at both the federal and state levels to comply and understand exceptions to the laws. 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule is analyzed, and Maryland law stands in for state law. Most 
mental health providers are familiar with the theory of duty to warn. This paper explores 
the cause for state duty to warn laws and apply the legal theory, and specifically 
Maryland’s laws, to CVE related intervention programs. Since CVE programs are a 
collaboration of practitioners from various fields, it is useful for all involved to 
understand the way that medical confidentiality and duty to warn laws impact the 
operations of CVE intervention programs. The paper then suggests models for 
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collaboration that may be applied to CVE programs as a whole, and work groups 
consisting of members from different disciplines.  
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II. MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE THEORY OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
A. FEDERAL PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 
The theory of confidentiality in health care may be traced to the Hippocratic Oath, 
which states, “What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of 
the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I 
will keep to myself, holding such things shameful to be spoken about.”76 For health care 
practitioners, confidentiality is both an ethical and a legal issue. Confidentiality is 
essential for the treatment of both physical and mental health issues, but as Benitez 
reminds us, “Confidentiality is defined as a restriction on the volunteering of information 
outside of the courtroom setting, not to be confused with the concept of psychotherapist-
patient privilege.”77 Privilege is a legal concept that involves special relationships 
between such practitioners as lawyers and medical professionals and their clients. 
Privilege has to do with the right of the client to withhold testimony in court by the 
individual with whom they hold the relationship.78 According to her article in The 
Therapist titled, “Confidentiality and it Exceptions (Including the U.S. Patriot Act),” 
Benitez explains the difference between confidentiality and privilege: 
These terms are not synonymous. They apply in different circumstances 
and are addressed in separate sections of law. The psychotherapist patient 
privilege affords the holder of the privilege (usually the patient) the right 
to withhold testimony (your testimony) in a court of law. The 
psychotherapist-patient privilege arises from the special relationship 
therapists have with their patients. It is an exception to the general rule 
that requires testimony from witnesses who are subpoenaed to provide 
such testimony.79 
                                                 76 Ask a Librarian, “Guides: Bioethics: Hippocratic Oath,” Johns Hopkins University, accessed July 
13, 2016, http://guides.library.jhu.edu/c.php?g=202502&p=1335752. 




According to one expert, “Without assurances of confidentiality, patients will be 
reluctant to divulge sensitive information about their physical and mental health, 
behavior, and lifestyle that would be vital to the individual’s treatment.”80 During 
testimony before the Congressional Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Professor Mark Rothstein of the University 
Of Louisville School Of Medicine spoke of the importance of confidentiality of medical 
records by stating: 
The Privacy Rule codifies this crucial requirement for ethical and effective 
health care. Surveys of patients indicate that many of them, fearful of 
disclosure of their sensitive health information, currently engage in 
“defensive practices” by withholding certain information from their health 
care providers. Any weakening of privacy protections would undoubtedly 
increase the use of defensive practices.81 
In his testimony, Rothstein cited a survey conducted by the California Healthcare 
Foundation in which two thirds of the public surveyed expressed concern over the 
privacy and security of their health information.82 
To ensure the protection of sensitive and private health information, the federal 
government and states have passed legislation defining the legalities. The laws define the 
circumstances in which a practitioner may or must disclose confidential information. This 
chapter analyzes the laws, explains the circumstances, and applies the laws to mental 
health practitioners working in the realm of CVE.  
Federal laws tend to be broad and far-reaching forms of legislation that in many 
cases define what is allowable at the state and local levels of government. Many federal 
regulatory laws may be viewed as defining the “bare minimum,” which then opens the 
door for state law to impose stricter requirements. As a result, state laws are frequently 
                                                 80 Mark A. Rothstein, Testimony of Mark A. Rothstein Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, 2013), 1–2, http://docs. 
house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20130426/100769/HHRG-113-IF02-Wstate-RothsteinM-20130426.pdf. 
81 Ibid. 




more restrictive than federal laws covering the same topic.83 The negative consequence 
of the existence of different laws affecting the same topic, but created by different levels 
of government, is the legal confusion they may create. While this combination of laws 
affords some practitioners and patients a great deal of confidentiality protection, it also 
makes for confusion, as standards and strictures change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
When referring to confidentiality law, most practitioners refer to HIPAA. Rarely are state 
laws spoken of or cited. When state laws afford exceptions, they must also align with the 
federal law. For example, Maryland law allows for the sharing of confidential medical 
information with any state sanctioned representative conducting their official business. 
This exception must then also align with the Privacy Act exceptions.84 
1. HIPAA Background 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, commonly known as 
HIPAA, is the federal law of the land regulating health care information. As a result, 
HIPAA, and the accompanying Privacy Rule, represent the bare minimum of legal 
regulation of PHI. Due to the confusion surrounding the implications of the law, HIPAA 
has been described as the elephant in the room that may need to be euthanized (or at least 
better defined and explained to the public and practitioners).85 The application of the 
federal law has created a confusing environment in which health care providers must 
learn to operate. The impact of the law is so confusing that both government and private 
companies frequently bring in outside experts to conduct training for employees. Even 
with specialized training, a lot of confusion remains concerning who the law applies to, 
and what the law requires or allows. It has been asserted that medical entities regulated 
by federal law may use the existence of the law as an excuse not to make lawful 
                                                 83 John Petrila and Hallie Fador-Towe, Information Sharing in Criminal Justice—Mental Health 
Collaborations: Working with HIPAA and Other Privacy Laws (Lexington, KY: CSG Justice Center, 
2010), vii, https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Information_Sharing_in_Criminal_ 
Justice-Mental_Health_Collaborations-2.pdf. 
84 State of Maryland, 22. Medical Records Act--Duty to Hold Confidential and Duty to Disclose a 
Medical Record, Health-General Article § § 4-301--4-309, 8-601(Baltimore, MD: Maryland Department of 
Mental Health and Hygiene, n.d.), accessed September 12, 2016, http://dhmh.maryland.gov/psych/pdfs/ 
Medicalreports.pdf. 
85 Officer Scott Davis, Crisis Intervention Team, Montgomery County Police. 
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disclosures of medical information in situations that may warrant the disclosure. The lack 
of disclosure may be the result of ignorance of what laws dictate, allow, or mandate; or 
the laws may actually be used as an excuse not to disclose if the disclosure is deemed 
inconvenient or burdensome.86 
As with all legislation, HIPAA began as a bill, proposed by U.S. Senators Edward 
Kennedy and Nancy Kassebaum to address privacy and confidentiality with health care 
information. Prior to the proposal of the bill, no federal law regulated the confidentiality 
of PHI.87 The bill was passed by Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton on 
August 21, 1996. The new federal law (HIPAA) was also known as Pub. L. No. 104-
191.88 Even though the original intent of the bill, and subsequent law, was to regulate the 
electronic transfer of private medical information, and to mandate privacy regulations on 
certain covered entities, HIPAA and the Privacy Rule have “become the de facto legal 
standard for health privacy issues involving both covered and un-covered entities in the 
United States.”89 
Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) provides the regulations and 
rules that apply to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Section 160. 
103 provides the federal definition of health care as: 
care, the services and supplies related to an individual’s health, are all 
considered health care. Preventative, diagnostic, rehabilitative, 
maintenance, or palliative care, counseling service, assessment, or 
procedure with respect to the physical or mental condition or functional 
                                                 86 Rothstein, Testimony of Mark A. Rothstein Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 4. 
87 Daniel J. Solove, “HIPAA Turns 10: Analyzing the Past, Present and Future Impact,” Journal of 
AHIMA 84, no. 4 (April 2013): 22–28. 
88 Rebecca Herold and Kevin Beaver, The Practical Guide to HIPAA Privacy and Security 
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status of an individual or that affects the structure or function of the 
body.90 
HIPAA defines regulated health information as, “[i]individually identifiable 
health information transmitted by electronic media, maintained in electronic media, 
transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium.”91 HIPAA uses this definition to 
identify what is referred to as PHI under the law. PHI may also be described as any 
information related to health care that may individually identify the patient, such as any 
data that relates to an individual’s past, present, or future physical or mental health, 
payment, or provision of care to the individual.92 PHI covered by HIPAA includes: 
 Patient names 
 Geographic areas smaller than a state to include street addresses, city or 
town, county, precinct, or zip code 
 Numerical identifiers, such as telephone numbers, social security numbers, 
medical record numbers, health plan beneficiary numbers, account 
numbers, certificate/license numbers, device identifiers and serial 
numbers, and elements of dates related to birth, death, admission or 
discharge, except for the year 
 Email addresses 
 Vehicle identifiers 
 Computer identifiers, such as uniform resource locators and internet 
provider addresses 
 Images and photographs 
 Biometric identifiers, such as DNA, fingerprints, and voice prints 
 Any other identifying factor unique to the patient93 
                                                 90 Cornell University Law, LII/Legal Information Institute, “45 CFR 160.103—Definitions,” accessed 
July 23, 2016, https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/45/160.103; U.S. Government, 45 CFR Part 160—
Subchapter C—Administrative Data Standards and Related Requirements (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, n.d.), 698, accessed August 6, 2016, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2007-title45-
vol1/pdf/CFR-2007-title45-vol1-part160.pdf. 
91 Herold and Beaver, The Practical Guide to HIPAA Privacy and Security Compliance, 16. 
92 “Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule,” May 7, 2008, http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/ 
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HIPAA delegated the DHHS as the arm of the federal government responsible for 
implementing and enforcing HIPAA and the standards inherent in the law.94 The original 
language of the law, located in Sections 261–264, assigned responsibility to the Secretary 
of DHHS to make public the standards and practices for the exchange and protection of 
PHI.  
Furthermore, the law required that the Secretary of DHHS issue the regulations 
mandating the accomplishment of the law if Congress failed to do so within three years 
after the law was passed. DHHS released a proposed set of standards to the public for 
comment in November 1999. In 2002, DHHS released the Standards for Privacy of 
Individual Identifiable Health Information, which is commonly referred to as the Privacy 
Rule.95 DHHS also assigned oversight and enforcement responsibilities to its Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR).96 
2. The Privacy Rule 
The Privacy Rule creates the national standards for the protection of PHI. The 
main goal of the Privacy Rule is to balance the confidentiality of an individual’s PHI with 
society’s needs. When crafting the Privacy Rule, DHHS recognized that the disclosure or 
sharing of otherwise protected PHI was sometimes necessary to accomplish public health 
goals and other community needs.  
Public health practice often requires the acquisition, use, and exchange of 
PHI to perform public health activities (e.g., public health surveillance, 
program evaluation, terrorism preparedness, outbreak investigations, 
direct health services, and public health research). Such information 
enables public health authorities to implement mandated activities (e.g., 
identifying, monitoring, and responding to death, disease, and disability 
among populations) and accomplish health objectives.97 
                                                 94 Herold and Beaver, The Practical Guide to HIPAA Privacy and Security Compliance, 6. 
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96 Ibid. 
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The Privacy Rule applies its regulations to organizations it refers to as covered 
entities, “health plans, health care clearing houses, and any health care provider who 
transmits any health care information electronically.”98 Due to the sometimes ambiguous 
nature of laws and the manner in which they are written, whether an agency, or an 
individual, qualifies as a covered entity remains vague. Many practitioners have taken the 
stance that they are covered entities and conduct their business within the guidelines of 
the Privacy Rule. According to a report sponsored by the federal Bureau of Justice 
Assistance titled, Information Sharing in Criminal Justice-Mental Health Collaborations: 
Working with HIPAA and Other Privacy Laws, “HIPAA’s restrictions on sharing health 
information are often misunderstood, which has resulted in practitioners’ misapplying the 
law to be far more restrictive than the actual regulatory language requires.”99 
In general, the Privacy Rule provides for the following areas: 
 Gives patients increased control over their own health information 
 Describes the confines related to the use, maintenance, and disclosure of 
health records 
 Sets protective measures that most health-care providers must follow to 
protect the confidentiality of PHI 
 Enforces violations of the Privacy Rule with civil and criminal penalties 
which are enforced by the DHHSOCR 
 Balances individual privacy with the good of the public 
 Allows patients to make decisions on how their own PHI may be used  
 Allows patients the opportunity to learn if a covered entity has disclosed 
their PHI 
 Limits PHI disclosure to the amount minimally reasonable to accomplish 
the purpose of the disclosure 
 In most cases, allows the patient the right to have copies of their own 
medical records and the ability to request corrections 
                                                 98 “Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.” 
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 Allows individuals to control the use and disclosure of their PHI100 
When deciphering the meaning inherent in the Privacy Rule, one of the first steps 
involves determining who is a covered entity, or who is regulated by the Rule. At first 
look, it seems that the entities covered are any health plan, health care clearing house, or 
any health care provider who transmits PHI electronically.101 As noted previously, both 
behavioral and physical health care providers are covered entities. The law does not 
differentiate between organizations that provide general care and specialty health care 
providers or facilities. Correctional facility health care is covered.102 
As important as determining who or what may be covered is determining who or 
what is not covered. LE agencies and officers are not covered entities. “The HIPAA 
Privacy Rule broadly defines law enforcement as ‘any government official at any level of 
government authorized to either investigate or prosecute a violation of the law.”103 As a 
result, LE is not bound by the regulations when asked to provide PHI to others, unless the 
LE officer originally gained the information from another entity covered by the 
regulations.104 For example, if a LE official obtains PHI as the result of an exception, the 
PHI may not be further shared unless the subsequent recipient also falls under an 
exception. Courts and judicial systems are also not covered by HIPAA or the Privacy 
Rule due to the responsibility they hold in sentencing or monitoring the treatment of 
persons in the system. This exclusion also takes into account the court’s role in 
overseeing treatment and compliance with its rulings.105 “Correctional institutions are not 
considered ‘covered entities’ under HIPAA unless they classify themselves as such.”106 
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These instances may be an example of the institution applying the boundaries of the law 
in an over-reaching manner due to a lack of understanding of the law, or because it is 
easier to be classified as a covered entity and then not have to face civil liability for 
releasing PHI even if the disclosure is allowable under the language of the law.  
The Privacy Rule also identifies what it describes as hybrid entities; covered 
entities that perform functions that are both covered and not covered.107 A hybrid entity 
may separate its functions so that the Privacy Rule only applies to those functions that 
align with covered entities. The remaining functions would not fall under the regulation 
of the Rule.108 The onus for determining which components are covered falls upon the 
entity. The portions of the hybrid entity must then function as standalone covered entities 
and must treat the non-covered components as it would outside business associates in 
terms of abiding to the Privacy Rule.109 
The Privacy Rule mandates some affirmative duties on covered entities. These 
duties represent standards that must be adopted by any covered entity. The Privacy Rule 
requires that covered entities:110 
 Notify individuals of their privacy rights as afforded by the Privacy Act, 
and of how any of their PHI may be used or disclosed 
 Create and implement internal policies and procedures for the safekeeping 
of PHI (including physical security procedures) 
 Train employees on the policies and procedures 
 Assign employees to manage the enactment of privacy policies and who 
will handle related complaints 
 Include appropriate privacy regulations in contracts with business partners  
 Entities must accommodate clients’ rights  
                                                 107 U.S. Government, 45 CFR Part 164 Subpart A—General Provisions (Washington, DC: 
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The Privacy Rule defines the term disclosure as, “the release, transfer, provision 
of, access to or divulging in any other manner of information outside the entity holding 
the information.”111 The Privacy Rule mandates the disclosure of PHI in only two 
circumstances, to the individual owner of the PHI (patient), and when required by the 
Secretary of DHHS when the agency needs to determine if a covered entity is complying 
with the regulations set forth in the Rule.112 
The Privacy Rule also delineates when it is may be permissible for a covered 
entity to disclose PHI. It is important to note that these exceptions are not required, but 
that the Rule allows for the disclosures under certain situations. The most obvious and 
broad exception is the use of consent by the owner of the PHI to disclose or use the 
information. When the use of the PHI is not for the purposes of treatment, billing, or 
otherwise permitted by the Privacy Rule, a covered entity must obtain written permission 
from the individuals to disclose their PHI.113 This option may apply in cases where the 
individual is referred to the covered entity by a court, such as community supervision or 
when the court allows a supervising agent, such as a parole or probation agent, the ability 
to obtain medical records to ensure compliance with a court mandate for the individual. 
Courts may make a condition of an individual’s release from custody or a treatment order 
that the individual grant consent for providers to release the individual’s PHI to ensure 
compliance.114 
It is also acceptable for covered entities to disclose de-identified PHI. The Rule 
does not place any restrictions on the use of, or disclosure of de-identified PHI. The Rule 
clearly defines de-identified PHI as “aggregate statistical data or data stripped of 
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individual identifiers.”115 Title 45 CFR Part 164 Subpart E §164. 514 defines the process 
for creating de-identified PHI and provides a list of identifiers that must be removed from 
PHI to qualify as de-identified.116 The process of de-identifying PHI to remove the 
protections on the information provided by the Privacy Rule may be referred to as a “Safe 
Harbor” method. The process requires the removal of 18 identifiers from the PHI. The 
identifiers include information, such as names, numerical identifiers, images, and 
biometric information.117 The remaining information must not be capable of being used 
to identify the subject.118 
Federal Title 45 CFR Part 164 Subpart E §164. 512 is titled “Uses and disclosures 
for which an authorization or opportunity to agree or object is not required.”119 As the 
title indicates, this section of the Privacy rule allows for the disclosure of PHI without the 
owner’s consent.120 The Rule allows for the disclosure of PHI under certain conditions, 
but the Rule does not mandate or require the disclosure. The disclosure may, however, be 
mandatory under other law, such as state laws (see exception [a] or [c]). The exceptions 
listed in the section include:121 
a) Uses and disclosures required by law 
b) Standard uses and disclosures for public health activities 
c) Disclosures concerning the victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence 
d) Disclosures for health oversight activities 
e) Disclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings 
f) Disclosures for law enforcement purposes 
g) Uses and disclosures in relation to medical examiners and coroners 
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h) Cadaveric organ, eye, or tissue donation 
i) Research purposes 
j) Disclosures to avert serious threats to health and safety 
k) Specialized government functions 
The aforementioned letters also correspond with the paragraph sections in the Rule. This 
section focuses on paragraphs (j) and (k).  
§164. 512 paragraph (j) provides perhaps some of the most applicable guidance 
when considering the Privacy Rule in connection with the relationship between mental 
health practitioners and LE. The section reads as follows: 
(j) Standard: Uses and disclosures to avert a serious threat to health or 
safety– 
(1) Permitted disclosures. A covered entity may, consistent with 
applicable law and standards to ethical conduct, use or disclose 
protected health information, if the covered entity, in good faith, 




(A) Is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and 
imminent threat to the health and safety of a person or the 
public; and 
(B) Is to a person or persons reasonably able to prevent or 
lessen the threat, including the target of the threat; or 
(ii) Is necessary for law enforcement authorities to identify or 
apprehend an individual 
(A) Because of a statement by an individual admitting 
participation in a violent crime that the covered entity 
reasonably believes may have caused serious physical harm 
to the victim.122 
The section goes on to state that the use and disclosure of the PHI referenced in (j) 
(1) (ii) (A) is not permitted if the information is discovered by the covered entity during 
treatment in which the covered entity is determining the likelihood for the individual to 
                                                 122 U.S. Government, 45 CFR Part 164 Subpart E—Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
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commit the crime, or during counseling or therapy, or if the information is in relation to 
the reason for which the individual sought the treatment. In other words, if the covered 
entity is a therapist and is attempting to determine the likelihood of their patient 
committing a crime, the situation would not satisfy the exception. The section would also 
not be applicable if the propensity for the individual to commit the crime was the reason 
that the individual sought treatment.  
More broadly, paragraph (k), which addresses specialized government functions, 
focuses specifically on a national security exception to the Privacy Rule. Section (2) of 
the paragraph reads: 
National security and intelligence activities. A covered entity may disclose 
protected health information to authorized federal officials for the conduct 
of lawful intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other national security 
activities authorized by the National Security Act (50 U.S. C. 401, et seq. ) 
and implementing authority (e. g. Executive Order 12333).123 
Once again, it is important to note that even these “national security disclosures 
are permissive rather than mandatory under HIPAA (your doctor can say no), but the 
language—particularly the disclosures to agencies—is amazingly broad.”124 
B. MARYLAND HEALTH CARE LAWS 
Since each state has its own companion laws to the federal medical privacy law, 
this thesis uses Maryland’s health care laws as the example of state law. Maryland’s 
health care laws are similar to HIPAA and the Privacy Rule. For example, Maryland’s 
law allows for the disclosure of PHI under certain circumstances, which are similar to the 
Privacy Rule exceptions. Like the federal exceptions, the disclosures under these 
circumstances are permissible and not mandatory.  
Maryland law relating to health records may be found in the State Code Article 
titled Health-General under sections §4-301 through §4-309. Section §4-301 provides 
definitions, including that the statute applies to both physical and mental health care 
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providers. The statue also defines health care providers as anyone licensed, certified, or 
authorized by the state to perform their duties. The section also defines medical records 
to include “any oral, written, or other transmission in any form or medium of 
information” that may be entered into a patient’s file, identifies the patient, and relates to 
the care of the patient.125 
Section §4-302 has to do with confidentiality and the general disclosure of 
medical records. The section mandates that health care providers maintain the 
confidentiality of medical records and sets the authority for the release of the records in 
accordance with the section or by other law.  
Section §4-303 allows for the disclosure of medical records upon the request of 
the owner of the records (patient). The section outlines the consensual process and 
requires certain information regarding the authority to be in writing. The written authority 
is to include the period of time for which the authorization to release the records is valid 
(not to exceed one year). The one exception to the time limit is for cases in which the 
patient was referred for treatment by a criminal justice entity, such as a court. In these 
cases, the length of release authority extends until 30 days following the final disposition 
of the case.126 The section of the Code titled “Disclosures without authorization of person 
in interest” (§4-305) is a state law similar in structure to the exceptions provided in the 
federal Privacy Rule. This section also allows for disclosures, which are permissive, and 
not mandatory. The first line of the section reads, “This section may not be construed to 
impose an obligation on a health care provider to disclose a medical record.”127 Sub-
section 3 allows for the disclosure of medical records “to a government agency 
performing its lawful duties as authorized by an act of the Maryland General Assembly or 
the United States Congress.”128 The sub-section notes that further restrictions will follow 
in a subsequent sub-section related to the disclosure of mental health records. The 
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section, otherwise, permits the release of medical records by a provider to other 
government agencies in Maryland or federal government agencies by the provider 
without the authorization of the patient. Sub-section 6 goes on to authorize (permissive 
and not mandatory) the release of medical records if the provider “makes a professional 
determination that immediate disclosure is necessary to provide for the emergency health 
care needs of a patient.” What is of note concerning this area of the law is that it provides 
no interpretation of circumstances, and leaves the decision up to the provider.129 
Section §4-306, titled “Disclosures without authorization of person of interest—
Investigations,” is similar to the Privacy Rule’s 45 CFR Part 164 Subpart E §164. 512 
paragraph (f) in that it addresses compulsory disclosures in response to legal processes to 
include action needed to satisfy a subpoena, search warrant, or court order. These 
occasions involve a mandatory release of otherwise protected information in response to 
a legal order.  
The second part of §4-306 involves permitted disclosures without the consent or 
authorization of the patient. Sub-section (b) (1) reads as follows: 
(b) Permitted Disclosures, --A health care provider shall disclose a 
medical record without the authorization of a person of interest: 
(1) To a State or local government, or to a member of a 
multidisciplinary team assisting the unit, for the purposes of 
investigation or treatment in a case of suspected abuse or neglect of a 
child or adult, subject to the following conditions: 
(i) The health care provider shall disclose only the medical record 
of a person who is being assessed in an investigation or to whom 
services are being provided in with Title 5, Subtitle 7, or Title 14, 
Subtitle 3 of the Family Law Article; 
(ii) The health care provider shall disclose only the information in 
the medical record that will, in the professional judgment of the 
provider, contribute to the: 
1. Assessment of risk; 
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2. Development of a service plan; 
3. Implementation of a safety plan; or 
4. Investigation of the suspected case of abuse or neglect; and 
 
(iii) the medical record may be disclosed as provided in §§ 1-201, 
1-202, 1-204, and 1-205 of the Human Services Article.130 
Section 7 of paragraph (b) permits health care providers to release protected information 
to grand juries, prosecution agencies, LE agencies, or their agents in furtherance of a 
prosecution or investigation. The section of the law does, however, require that the 
receiving agency has written procedures in place designed to protect and safely store and 
use the information.  
Section §4-307 is the area of Maryland law that discusses the release of mental 
health records. Maryland duty to protect laws are discussed in a later chapter of this 
thesis. The statute separates mental health medical records from the personal notes of the 
provider. Personal notes are defined as “the work product or personal property of a 
mental health provider.”131 Personal notes must be kept separate from records, and may 
not include information concerning diagnosis or treatment.  
Paragraph (j) of the section addresses disclosures in relation to the health, safety, 
or protection of others. (j) (1) 2. (ii) connects directly with Maryland’s duty to protect 
provision’s Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article Section §5-609, which is discussed in 
the duty to warn chapter of this thesis.  
Section §4-308 absolves a health care provider from “any cause of action” for 
either disclosing or not disclosing a medical record if that action was taken in compliance 
with the law.  
C. ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL RECORDS AND CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS 
AND CVE 
Federal and state medical privacy laws protect patient’s PHI from disclosure. 
Patients have a need to feel that their private information is safe. Medical practitioners 
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need their patients to disclose full details of their patient’s condition to diagnose 
accurately and create treatment plans. As evidenced by the Hippocratic Oath, medical 
practitioners operate under strict ethical and legal mandates to protect their patient’s PHI 
from outside entities, including government. However, even laws designed to keep 
personal information private have exceptions built in to balance the individual’s right to 
privacy with the welfare of the public. CVE practitioners involved in intervention 
programs will be on the razor’s edge of this balance.  
As CVE intervention and diversion programs very much involve a mental health 
and medical component, which is balanced with the public safety component, a clear 
understanding of applicable laws is vital. CVE programs must balance confidentiality 
with the protection of the public.  
CVE programs include partnerships with NGOs and public agencies with multiple 
functions. The balance of applying privacy laws in an environment including multiple 
agencies with varying functions presents a challenge. CVE programs also represent what 
the Privacy Rule refers to as hybrid entities. As such, it is the responsibility of the 
program to decide which portions of the structure are bound by the Privacy Rule, and 
separate the different components of the program to comply with the law.  
In terms of disclosure of PHI, the Privacy Rule only mandates two circumstances 
of an affirmative obligation to disclose PHI. One instance involves open access of PHI to 
the patients themselves, and the other involves releasing PHI to DHHS for the purpose of 
auditing compliance with the law. Federal and state laws require that CVE intervention 
programs properly record and store medical information related to their clients. Both sets 
of laws dictate the requirements of record retention and storage. Clients receiving 
services from CVE programs have the right to review their medical records under the 
law. CVE programs are also required to explain the law to their clients. Programs must 
also be prepared to release medical records to DHHS in the event of an audit to ensure 
that the federal law is being followed.  
One of the easiest ways to disclose PHI is with the patient’s consent. The Privacy 
Rule requires written permission from the owner of the PHI. Some CVE programs might 
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use written consent when a client enters the program that would be in conjunction with an 
explanation of the rights afforded to the patient under the Privacy Rule and applicable 
state laws. It would also involve information on how the patient could revoke the consent. 
In cases where a patient is referred to a CVE program by a court system, consent on the 
part of the patient may be included in the referral if the court orders participation in the 
program.  
One of the interesting exceptions to confidentiality in the Privacy Rule involves 
the sharing of de-identified PHI. The Privacy Rule provides clear instruction on what 
constitutes de-identified PHI. According to the Privacy Rule, there are no restrictions on 
the use of de-identified PHI. The Privacy Rule refers to the use of de-identified PHI as 
the “safe harbor” use. It is possible that CVE practitioners may use de-identified PHI to 
discuss otherwise restricted information concerning clients with other practitioners. In 
such cases, where other options are not available, it may be possible for mental health 
practitioners to discuss particular details concerning a client if all information that 
identifies the patient is removed from the discussion. Under these circumstances, the 
practitioner would be responsible for ensuring that the discussion did not include any 
details that could be used to identify the patient.  
The most applicable portion of the Privacy Rule that has an impact on the ability 
of CVE practitioners to communicate details of potentially violent clients falls under the 
section describing the permissible exceptions to the Rule. The Rule begins explaining the 
exceptions by stating that they are restricted by the application of other laws or ethical 
standards. In other words, the exceptions exist when not restricted by other laws. The 
exceptions are required to balance the need for confidentiality with the obligation to 
protect other persons or the public.  
Of the sections describing allowable exceptions to confidentiality, the section 
discussing government functions is most applicable to situations likely to be encountered 
in a CVE environment. The Rule allows for the disclosure of PHI without the patient’s 
consent for certain government functions, including intelligence and national security 
functions. When other avenues permitting disclosure are exhausted, this section may 
allow practitioners to disclose information concerning clients who pose a risk to others by 
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violent means. Similar to other laws discussed, this section of the Privacy Act is broad 
and leaves much open to discretion and interpretation; however, the language makes it 
clear that the federal government’s authority to conduct intelligence and national security 
investigations is an exception to the Rule. It is important to remember that this exception 
is permissive and not mandatory, but the language of the Privacy Act leaves open the 
possibility for CVE practitioners to disclose PHI to the federal government in cases 
where the client poses a risk to others or the national interest.  
Maryland state law applying to the confidentiality of medical records is similar, 
and in many ways, mirrors the federal law. As with the federal law, Maryland state law 
begins by defining what and who are covered by the law. Based on Maryland’s legal 
definitions, CVE practitioners administering mental health services, including therapists 
and counselors, would be covered by the law. Maryland’s law also covers the use of 
consent by the patient as a means to use or disseminate medical information.  
Likewise, the section of Maryland law addressing disclosure without the 
authorization of the “person of interest,” is similar to the Privacy Rule. One broad 
difference is that Maryland law permits the disclosure of medical record information to 
government agencies “performing their lawful duties.” As with other aspects of both 
federal and state law, the exception is permissible and not mandatory unless required by 
other laws.  
Maryland separates mental health records into a separate section of the law. 
Similar to the minimally reasonable standard of the Privacy Rule, Maryland law 
mandates that mental health information released must only be relevant to the purpose of 
the disclosure. Maryland health confidentiality law refers to the legal section covering 
mental health records when referring to disclosure.  
Based on both federal and Maryland state law on the use and disclosure of PHI, it 
appears that the laws provide broad guidance on exceptions allowing for disclosure. In 
some circumstances, these conditions and what they mean may present confusing 
circumstances for practitioners.  
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III. THE DUTY TO WARN AND PROTECT 
Like other medical health professionals, mental health professionals have an 
ethical and legal obligation to protect their patient’s confidentiality. As with other health 
disciplines, this obligation is designed to facilitate a trusting relationship. While the 
protection of patient privacy is critical, and mandated by law, exceptions are built into the 
law. Some of the exceptions are permissive in nature, and some are obligatory. The 
exceptions, especially the mandated exceptions, are designed to balance confidentiality 
with the prevention of danger to the public. A legal requirement for mental health 
practitioners to warn or protect a third party from the actions of their patient is one such 
mandatory exception in many states.  
The most simple definition of the term duty to warn is that social workers, 
therapists, or another mental health workers have an ethical and legal obligation to warn a 
third party of a potential danger presented by the therapists’ client.132 The term duty to 
protect implies that the therapists have a larger obligation to take additional steps to 
protect a third party from their patients when they have reason to believe that the patients 
pose a violent threat to the third party. “The general rational on which such laws are 
predicated holds that certain individual rights must give way to the greater good of 
society or to the rights of a more vulnerable individual (e.g., in child abuse or child 
custody cases).”133 In terms of a state licensed therapist’s duty to warn or protect, the 
legislation only resides at the state level. No federal law mandates a duty to warn or 
protect.  
In his article, “Confidentiality and the Duty to Warn: Ethical and Legal 
Implications for the Therapeutic Relationship,” James Corbin speaks of the nature of 
confidentiality and the friction it may cause between the field of mental health and other 
                                                 132 Granich, “Duty to Warn, Duty to Protect.” 
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disciplines, such as elements of our legal system.134 Corbin concedes that outsiders may 
perceive mental health as an unreliable science and that mental health practitioners may 
view laws and the legal system as foreign and contrary to the aims of their profession.135 
Corbin describes the unavoidable intersection of the two worlds. As a result, the 
importance of cross training and knowledge of both systems is important to practitioners 
in both fields.136 
Scholars David Wexler and Bruce Winick coined the term “therapeutic justice” to 
describe a problem-solving process used to bring the two fields closer together.137 
Therapeutic jurisprudence describes the problem-solving process between 
two systems—a study on the impact of the system of law on mental health, 
as well as the impact of the social sciences on law.138 
The mental health system and our nation’s criminal justice systems (as 
well as civil court systems) depend on the expertise and knowledge base 
from each respective discipline, as well as the prudence of those 
specialists who have combined expertise, in attempts to address and solve 
problems. Both fields inform the practice of one another.139 
The theory of duty to warn or protect is one issue that is frequently a point of contention 
between practitioners of mental health and the legal system.  
Mental health practitioners are bound by the same legal and ethical rules as other 
health professionals. The American Psychiatric Association published “The Principles of 
Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry,” which outlines 
the ethical code of mental health professionals.  
Section 4 of the code states, “A physician shall respect the rights of patients, 
colleagues, and other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences and 




137 David B. Wexler, “Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,” Touro L. Rev. 24 (2008): 17. 




privacy within the constraints of the law.”140 The section also describes how mental 
health records must be protected with a high level of care and that a psychiatrist may only 
release the records with the permission of the patient or “under proper legal 
compulsion.”141 As important as the theory of confidentiality is to health care as a whole, 
the issue is magnified in the realm of mental health care. “The confidential relationship 
between mental health professionals and their clients has long stood as the cornerstone of 
the helping relationship.”142 
The need for confidentiality in psychotherapy has been described as a 
“cornerstone” upon which therapist and client relationships are built.143 Confidentiality is 
usually described as the restriction placed upon the disclosure of information by the 
mental health provider outside of courtroom settings, where the practitioner’s testimony 
is demanded. “Confidentiality refers to a general standard of professional conduct that 
obliges a professional not to discuss information about a client with anyone”144 As with 
regular health care, a difference exists between confidentiality and privilege in the realm 
of mental health care. Privilege refers to the legal immunity that certain specific types of 
relationships, such as therapist/client relationships, enjoy from testifying in court.145 As 
noted in the chapter on HIPAA, this thesis does not delve into the concept of privilege, 
and instead focuses on the issues surrounding the theory of confidentiality.  
The confidential relationships between psychotherapists and their clients are 
considered sacrosanct for very good reasons. When establishing a healing or helping 
relationship with a therapist, trust in an essential element. If potential patients believe that 
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professionals will disclose the personal experiences that they share during therapy, many 
persons needing treatment may choose not to seek help. The successful treatment of 
ailments requires that patients fully disclose their symptoms for the provider to diagnose 
the illness successfully and construct a treatment regimen. An argument for the protection 
of confidentiality recognizes that patients who do not trust the confidential nature of the 
relationship they have with their therapist may not fully disclose information needed to 
diagnose and treat their conditions.146 
Since duty-to-warn or -protect statutes, and subsequent interpretations by the 
judicial branches, exist at the state level, the laws and their application between states 
vary greatly. As shown in Figure 2, the states may be divided into the following three 
categories: states that mandate a duty to warn or protect, states that have permissive laws 
that allow therapists to warn or protect third parties, and states that have not enacted 
legislation concerning any duty to warn or protect.147 Each of these three categories 
presents therapists with certain obstacles that must be overcome for the therapist to treat 
their patients successfully and follow legal guidance.  
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Figure 2.  State Duty to Warn/Protect Laws.148 
In states with mandatory statutes, therapists must regulate the trusting relationship 
with their patients and also make a determination on whether patient disclosures rise to 
the level to which the law mandates a duty to warn or protect. In determining whether the 
therapists must discharge the duty to warn or protect, the therapists must evaluate the 
level of risk posed by their client and decide if it rises to the level required by that state’s 
specific guidance. Different states also make other requirements affected by the 
imminence of the potential threat, and whether the indented victim is known.149 
Therapists who work in states with permissive statutes face even more 
challenging decisions.  
Therapists in states with permissive statutes have several legally 
acceptable options when a patient makes a violent threat against an 
identifiable victim: continue therapy as planned without issuing any 
                                                 148 Source: “Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn,” September 28, 2015, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/health/mental-health-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx. 
149 Johnson, Govind, and Sisti, “The Tarasoff Rule: The Implications of Interstate Variation and Gaps 
in Professional Training,” 469–477. 
 52
warning, change the therapy to contain the threat and protect the potential 
victim, warn law enforcement, warn the victim, warn the victim and law 
enforcement, or determine if there are grounds for civil commitment based 
on the patient’s dangerousness to others.150 
In states with permissive legislation and law interpretations, the first two options 
present several legal and moral complications. If the therapist does not warn or notify the 
proper authorities and a third person becomes a victim, the therapist may be legally 
responsible since most states with permissive laws only cover the therapist from liability 
when a warning is made. Many of these state laws do not cover the therapist from 
liability when confidentiality is not breached, when valid reasons to warn, and then a 
third party victim is created. From a therapeutic standpoint, moral and treatment 
considerations may prevent the therapist from making a permissive notification, even 
when discharging a permissive duty to warn may be the safest course of action. “This 
moral basis serves as the foundation for legal duties to protect, which specify cases where 
legal requirements of clinician-patient confidentiality are removed to allow a clinician to 
try and avert harm to an identifiable victim.”151 
The third type of jurisdiction involves states with no statutory law or legal 
guidance. These states create a more challenging environment for therapists than the two 
previous categories. Without an affirmative duty to warn or protect, or a legal permissive 
ability to breach confidentiality, therapists in these states are in a very precarious 
position. If therapists breach confidentiality, they may be open to civil litigation. If the 
therapists fail to warn a potential victim, they may also be open to civil litigation. These 
two possibilities are in addition to the complexities involved in treating patients with 
violent potential, and preventing them from victimizing others.  
A. TARASOFF—THE ORIGIN OF DUTY TO WARN 
The terms “duty to warn” and “duty to protect” were born of a series of incidents, 
and subsequent legal maneuvers, in California in the late-1960s and mid-1070s. The 
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events of concern were litigated in the California case of Tarasoff v. Regents of 
University of California.152 The case involves the murder of a woman at the University of 
California (UC) Berkeley by a student who had been under psychiatric care. This seminal 
case was the first to use the terms “duty to warn” and “duty to protect” in legal 
jurisprudence. It is also the forerunner of all current duty-to-warn and -protect state laws. 
As a result, the topic of duty to warn or protect is frequently referred to as relating to 
Tarasoff, even though the Tarasoff case only directly applied to the state of California.  
The details are compelling. Tatiana Tarasoff, also known as Tanya, was born in 
China to Russian parents, as shown in Figure 3. The family then moved to Brazil until 
relocating to Berkeley, California, in 1963.153 
 
Figure 3.  Tatiana Tarasoff.154 
Prosenjit Poddar, seen in Figure 4, was raised in a small village in northern India 
and was a member of the Harijan (untouchable) caste. Poddar graduated from the Indian 
Institute of Technology in 1961 and relocated to Berkeley in 1967 as a graduate student 
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studying naval architecture. Poddar lived in the International Student House (ISH) at UC 
Berkeley.155 
 
Figure 4.  Prosenjit Poddar.156 
It has been reported that Poddar experienced a hard time transitioning from his 
home culture to American culture. This challenge was probably made more complicated 
by his being born into, and raised, in the Harijan caste. It was noted that Poddar, who had 
previously attended all-male schools, was especially challenged by the cultural 
differences in terms of relationships with women.157 
In 1968, Tarasoff and Poddar met at the ISH while Tarasoff was attending folk 
dancing classes. On New Year’s Eve, Tarasoff kissed Poddar, which led him to believe 
that she was interested in him romantically. When Poddar pursued Tarasoff, she declined 
his advances. Poddar became infatuated with Tarasoff. When Poddar learned that 
Tarasoff was engaged in sexual relationships with other men, his mental condition began 
to decline. Poddar began missing classes and work, and began spending time alone in his 
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room. In the summer of 1969, Tarasoff left to spend the summer in Brazil. While she was 
gone, a friend of Poddar’s encouraged him to seek treatment.158 
Poddar sought help at Cowell Memorial Hospital at UC Berkeley. During 
treatment under the supervision of Dr. Lawrence Moore, Poddar disclosed that he was 
going to kill a woman named Tatiana. Case law indicates that the intended victim was 
“readily identifiable” by Moore.159 Moore diagnosed Poddar with paranoid schizophrenia 
and consulted with colleagues. Believing that Poddar presented a danger to himself and 
others, Moore contacted the UC Berkeley police and asked that they take Poddar into 
custody. Moore further advised that he would commit Poddar. Campus police officers 
detained Poddar in his room. During the encounter, the police officers determined that 
Poddar appeared rational, instructed him to stay away from Tatiana, and did not transport 
him for commitment. Moore’s supervisor instructed that all therapy notes be destroyed 
and instructed that no further attempts to commit Poddar be attempted. Poddar stopped 
participating in treatment.160 
Upon her return to Berkeley, Tarasoff was open concerning her romantic 
escapades in Brazil. Upon learning of Tarasoff’s involvement with other men, Poddar’s 
mental state continued to deteriorate. On October 27, 1969, Poddar armed himself with a 
pellet gun and a knife, and went to Tarasoff’s residence. Poddar chased Tarasoff into the 
back yard and fatally stabbed her 17 times. Poddar then went back inside and called the 
police, who responded and arrested him.161 
Poddar was initially charged with murder, and was convicted of second-degree 
murder in spite of his defense of insanity. Poddar appealed, and a California Court of 
Appeals lowered the initial conviction to manslaughter. A new trial was ordered when it 
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was determined that the judge in the first case failed to provide adequate instructions to 
the jury concerning the issue of diminished capacity. Poddar was never re-tried, and 
California ultimately allowed him to leave the United States and return to India.162 
Tarasoff’s parents later brought a civil suit against the University of California for 
wrongful death. The initial case was dismissed, and the Tarasoffs appealed. The 
California Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision and found in favor of the 
defendants, that is, the university. The case was appealed again in front of the California 
Supreme Court. This time, the court agreed with the Tarasoffs and determined that the 
defendants should have warned Tatiana of the risk. In doing so, the California Supreme 
Court applied the legal theory of “duty to warn” to the therapists.163 
Due to the controversial nature of the court’s first opinion, and in an unusual 
maneuver, the California Supreme Court agreed to take a second look at its Tarasoff 
decision.164 As unusual as it was for the California Supreme Court to agree to a rehearing 
of the case, it became even more unusual when the second decision expanded on the 
decision of Tarasoff 1. The decision in Tarasoff 2 expanded the duty to warn in decision 
of Tarasoff 1 to the “duty to protect.” The case decisions are sometimes referred to as 
Tarasoff 1 and Tarasoff 2.165 
Tarasoff 2 looked at all the causes for action claimed by the plaintiffs (Tarasoffs), 
and decided to focus on one, the “Failure to warn on a dangerous patient.”166 The 
defendants in the case contended that they had “no duty of care to Tatiana or her parents 
and that in the absence of such duty, they were free to act in careless disregard of 
Tatiana’s life and safety.”167 
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In its analysis, the court determined that the most important consideration in terms 
of a failure to warn on behalf of the defendants was the issue of foreseeability. According 
to the opinion provided by Judge Tobriner in the case, “As a general principle, a 
‘defendant owes a duty of [17 Cal. 3d 435] care to all persons who are foreseeably 
endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct 
unreasonably dangerous.’”168 The court further noted that historically, affirmative action 
had been required if the defendant had a “special relationship” with either the individual 
posing a danger, or the intended victim. The relationship between a therapist and a patient 
qualified as a special relationship, which left the issue of whether therapists should have 
foreseen their client’s future action.169 
The defense counter-argued that therapists cannot predict whether a patient will 
act violently in the future with any degree of accuracy, and, in fact, practitioners likely 
would over-report their concerns.170 
In support of this argument amicus representing the American Psychiatric 
Association and other professional societies cites numerous articles which 
indicate that therapists, in the present state of the art, are unable reliably to 
predict violent acts; their forecasts, amicus claims, tend consistently to 
over-predict violence, and indeed are more often wrong.171 
The court determined that making diagnoses is a central function of psychiatrists 
and psychologists, and in doing so, these practitioners do routinely make predictions. 
According to the court’s decision, “Thus the judgment of the therapist in diagnosing 
emotional disorders and in predicting whether a patient presents a serious danger of 
violence is comparable to the judgment which doctors and professionals must regularly 
render under accepted rules of responsibility.”172 The court did recognize the difficulty 
inherent in the process of predicting behavior, and noted that a perfect performance on 
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the part of therapists was not expected or necessary. The actions of a therapist in making 
predictions must only be reasonable in the context of the circumstances and as 
comparable to others in the field. The court also pointed out that the defendants in the 
Tarasoff case did accurately predict Poddar’s violent behavior and the threat he posed, 
but failed to warn or protect the victim.  
The significant conclusion of the court’s decision was the determination that once 
a therapist does determine that a patient poses a threat to another (or should have 
determined based on the reasonableness of the circumstances and common practice), the 
therapist is responsible to act upon a duty to protect the threatened party.173 This 
expansion of the duty to warn to a duty to protect increases the affirmative action that a 
therapist must take to protect a third party by imposing duties in addition to a warning. 
The court opined that the risk of predicting false warnings was overshadowed and made 
reasonable by the potential for the saving of lives and protecting third parties from 
danger.  
In regards to the crucial nature involved in protecting confidential 
communications between therapists and their patients, the court acknowledged the 
importance of confidentiality and the role it plays in the successful treatment of patients, 
but weighed the interest of the confidentiality against the welfare of the public and the 
need to protect the public from future acts of violence.174 
In providing the majority decision for the case, Judge Tobriner authored the now 
famous lines, “We conclude that the public policy favoring protection of the confidential 
character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which 
disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the 
public peril begins.”175 
                                                 173 “Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California—17 Cal.3d 425—Thu, 07/01/1976|California 




B. MARYLAND DUTY TO WARN AND PROTECT LAW 
Maryland is a mandatory duty-to-protect state. The affirmative nature of the duty 
may differ from other states in that it provides for options in which a therapist may act 
and does not specifically dictate which option the therapist must choose. The statute is 
located in Maryland’s Courts and Judicial Proceedings Section §5-60.176 
Section (a) of the statue defines to whom the law applies. Mental health care 
providers who must be licensed in the state are covered by the law. Definitions of who 
must be licensed are provided in the Health Occupations Statute under Section §17-
101.177 Licensing requirements for social workers may be found under the Health 
Occupations Statute under Title 19-Social Workers Subtitle 3-Licensing Title §19-301.178 
Section §5-609 defines a mental health care provider as, “a mental health care 
provider licensed under the Health Occupations Article or any facility, corporation, 
partnership, association, or other entity that provides treatment or services to individuals 
who have mental disorders.”179 
Section (b) outlines the mandated duty to protect as occurrences when a mental 
health care provider is aware that a patient is capable of violent behavior against a known 
victim or group of victims. The statue provides immunity from legal or disciplinary 
action of the provider for discharge of the duty to warn or protect. Section (b) also 
describes the manner in which a provider may come to know of the threat posed by a 
patient as the patient’s spoken word, writing, or conduct.180 
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Section (c) (2) provides the options for the discharge of the duty that a provider 
may take. The statue allows for discretion on the part of the provider either to seek 
commitment of the patient, construct a treatment plan to address the potential violence, 
inform a LE agency of the danger posed by the patient, or warn the intended victim(s). If 
the provider decides to provide a warning to LE or the intended victim(s), the stature 
delineates that the warning must include the nature of the threat, identity of the patient, 
and the identity of the intended victim(s). As a result, Maryland’s law is both a duty to 
warn and a duty to protect statute. The law is mandatory in requiring the therapist to take 
action to protect, but allows discretion in how the provider discharges the duty. The law 
also states that the actions taken by the provider must be both reasonable and timely.181 
C. ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION TO CVE 
Confidentiality is a vital component of the therapist/patient relationship. Without 
the trusting relationship created by the existence of confidentiality, patients in need of 
treatment may not seek it, patients may not disclose all information needed for the mental 
health worker to diagnose and treat the patient properly, and patients may stop treatment 
(as was seen with Poddar). The reasons for the confidentiality and trust are also a benefit 
to society when they facilitate the successful diagnosis and treatment of the mental health 
patient.  
This balance of trust with the responsibility to protect others from their patient’s 
potential violent acts creates a precarious responsibility for therapists. The element of risk 
lies inherent in both the treatment of the patient and the protection of the public. When 
treating patients vulnerable to radicalization, engaged in radicalization, or radicalized, the 
threat of danger to others and the risk to the patient are always present.  
A therapist must first diagnose a patient before administering treatment. In cases 
where the patient has indicated a threat to others, the therapist must determine if the 
threat is viable. A determination of whether the patient intends to carry out the threat, or 
is just venting frustration must be made. The therapist must determine if the patient has 
the means to carry out the threat. For example, a patient threatening to kill his wife with 
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 61
whom he resides may be more credible than a threat to kill an ex-girlfriend who resides 
on another continent.  
Many state laws, such as Maryland’s, require that the threat posed by the patient 
be imminent, but provide no definition of what that means. The therapist must determine 
the imminence of their patient’s threat to another. Without guidance on what constitutes 
imminent, practitioners are left to their own devices to make the determination.  
As a result, mental health providers are responsible for treating patients suffering 
from mental health disorders, successfully diagnosing the disorder, creating a treatment 
plan, enacting the plan, monitoring the progress and adjusting as necessary, and being 
wary of danger the patient may pose to others. In the situations when the patient poses a 
danger, the practitioners must understand the boundaries of the law in the state in which 
they are practicing, determine if the threat is imminent, and then determine what to do. 
Risk assessment is a constant element in all phases of the therapist’s role.  
Maryland’s duty to protect law applies to CVE practitioners providing therapy to 
referred clients. As licensed social workers or therapists, CVE practitioners are working 
in an environment rife with risk, and are bound by the duty to protect others. As such, 
when licensed mental health providers working in the CVE field in Maryland are treating 
patients, they must determine if the patient poses a threat to others. The threat may be 
communicated in words, writing, or other action.  
Even though Maryland’s law mandates an affirmative action on the part of the 
provider, the law allows for discretion on the part of the provider in the form of options 
which may be applied. In Maryland, providers are not mandated to warn the victim, 
although they may elect to do so. Maryland’s law allows for the provider to address the 
threat by having the patient civilly committed for further treatment, establishing a more 
robust treatment plan, or making notification to the appropriate LE agency and the 
potential victim.  
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Maryland’s duty to protect only applies to future crimes, and does not apply to 
crimes that have already been committed. The law also indicates that the victim, or 
victims, must be identifiable.182 
The decision by a therapist to breach confidentiality remains a challenging issue. 
Identifying risk, and determining the seriousness or level of risk remains critical. A 
possibility exists that therapists, who are ethically and morally bound to protect the 
confidentiality of their patients, may be more inclined to try and treat patients as their 
choice of options, when in fact, the more appropriate response might have been to warn 
the victim and alert LE of the danger. While discretion is important in both mental health 
care and LE, some practitioners may elect to take what they believe is the safer ethical 
route and treat the patient as their response to discharging their protective duty.  
The fields of mental health and LE are frequently misunderstood in general, and 
practitioners in both fields frequently do not possess an adequate understanding or 
appreciation of the other field. Corbin, Wexler, and Winick point out the conflict between 
the two professions while highlighting the importance of cooperation.183 Mental health 
and LE will always overlap. The theory of therapeutic justice seeks to educate 
practitioners in both fields on the work of the other, and bring the two disciplines closer 
together. Both fields possess the same super-ordinate goal of helping others, but a lack of 
understanding or cooperation may block the efforts of one field instead of creating a 
complimentary union.  
Practitioners in both fields are motivated and bound by ethical and moral values. 
Both fields are also impacted by laws that regulate or permit actions taken in pursuit of 
the specific field’s goals, while still under the shadow of the broad goal of helping others. 
Therapists focus on their patients, and LE may focus on victims. The victims are 
sometimes the therapists’ patients, and at other times, victims may be created by these 
patients. In terms of confidentiality and treatment of their patients, therapists are bound 
by both ethical and legal means. It is therefore important for LE professionals to 
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understand the role of the therapist and the benefit to society of the successful treatment 
provided by the therapist. The therapist, on the other hand, must understand that at some 
point, the protection of society may outweigh the individual patient. In short, a balance 
must exist between the obligation the therapists have to their clients and the safety of the 
public. As noted by the second Tarasoff decision, the balance must always tip in favor of 
public safety as a whole. The protected privilege, should in fact, end where the public 
peril begins.  
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IV. MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH 
CVE programs are designed to operate as collaborative entities. The models bring 
together various entities and experts who may not normally work together. The models 
are designed to apply all the correct resources deemed necessary to achieve the goals of 
the program. This approach does, however, create challenges for organizing, managing, 
and ensuring the entities complement each other, remain focused on the goal, and 
collaborate effectively. Two of the main groups involved in CVE are represented by LE 
and mental health practitioners. As referenced earlier, conflict and cooperation between 
the two groups have previously existed in various venues. CVE adds additional 
ingredients to the pot by including additional resources and disciplines. Fortunately, 
collaborative models have been used successfully in other areas.  
As the FBI has prepared to refer individuals to CVE programs for intervention, 
the agency has begun referring to the intervention practitioners as a MDT. The definition 
fits, but as shall be seen, the method and application as used by the FBI may not be 
appropriate.  
For many years, different fields have relied on multidiscipline efforts to find the 
best approach to a super-ordinate goal. MDTs are sometimes also referred to as 
interdisciplinary teams, but the two are actually somewhat different, and the definition 
sometimes depends on the discipline in which it is used. MDTs have historically been 
used in the fields of private industry, health care, special education, and for child abuse 
investigations.  
MDTs are typically composed of a group of professionals from different fields 
who share a common goal, but contribute different areas of expertise to the effort. In the 
field of medicine, interdisciplinary teams may be defined as, “a group of healthcare 
professionals from diverse fields who work in a coordinated fashion toward a common 
goal for the patient,” as opposed to a MDT defined as, “a team of professionals including 
representatives of different disciplines who coordinate the contributions of each 
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profession, which are not considered to overlap, in order to improve patient care.”184 In 
the United States, MDTs have been used in hospitals for more than 50 years.185 
The MDT approach identifies practitioners with critical responsibilities to an 
issue, and brings those practitioners together to form a team. The practitioners represent 
agencies that have a stake in the solution of the challenge. The practitioners are brought 
together as subject matter experts on their aspect or interest in the issue. The goal is to 
form a team of experts where each expert represents a different discipline for the purpose 
of collaborating on complex challenges. One of the assumptions of the effort is that 
individual practitioners would not benefit from the expertise of team members from 
different disciplines if the team was not formed. The practitioners represent each of their 
disciplines and work to collaborate the efforts of their organizations with the partner 
agencies. The goal is to create a common plan to overcome a challenge and identify the 
role of each discipline.  
MDTs have been used in the United Stated for several decades, with a high level 
of success, in the area of physical and sexual child abuse. The MDT approach was first 
applied to child sexual abuse in the 1980s by the National Children’s Advocacy Center 
(NCAC) in Huntsville, Alabama. At the time, social services providers, members of the 
criminal justice system, and LE officers were not effectively working together to address 
child sexual abuse issues. Members of these different disciplines pursued the same super-
ordinate goal of protecting children, but the services provided were different, and what 
others were doing was not clear, or the mission of other practitioners was not really 
known either. A district attorney and now former Congressman from Alabama, Bud 
Cramer, recognized the lack of coordination, and assisted in forming MDTs with the 
various disciplines. Cramer organized representatives from the fields of child protective 
services (CPS), LE, medical and mental health practitioners, and attorneys and formed 
the first MDT for assisting child victims. The formation of the MDT also created the first 
child advocacy center (CAC), which evolved into a coordinated center where all aspects 
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involved with the response to sexual crimes committed against children, as shown in 
Figure 5, could be addressed.186 
 
Figure 5.  NCAC Organizational Chart.187 
According to the NCAC: 
This innovative model recognized that in order for the United States to 
effectively respond to this issue that a unique public-private partnership 
was essential, and that the various agencies and departments responsible 
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for the protection of children must be united in a collaborative effort to 
respond with the recognition that no one agency by itself could assure the 
protection of children.188 
This new approach was received with a certain amount of uncertainly by members 
of the different involved groups. Eventually, members of the MDT grew to appreciate the 
strength of the team. A greater understanding of different roles and an appreciation for 
the collaborative approach became obvious. Since that time, the CAC model of MDT has 
spread to over 950 CACs in the United States and to over 25 other countries.189 
The investigation and response to the report of child abuse is a complicated and 
complex endeavor that necessitates the involvement of numerous different professionals 
from various different disciplines. The members of each area represent different, but 
aligned, missions with the same goal of protecting and assisting the victim.  
LE is obviously tasked with the investigation of reported child abuse crimes. CPS 
social workers also investigate the reports of abuse and neglect, and frequently do so in 
conjunction with LE. Interviewing children in general, and especially children who may 
be the victims of horrible crimes, requires a very specialized skill set. CPS social 
workers, who are typically specially trained to conduct interviews with children, often 
conduct the interviews on behalf of LE. In the world of LE, it is rare that a professional 
from another field is relied upon so heavily to contribute such an important part of an 
investigation. As a result, a strong relationship between the LE and CPS workers is more 
than essential.  
Medical and mental health professionals are brought into the equation to provide 
treatment, but are also used to gather both physical and testimonial evidence. In 
jurisdictions with CACs, specially trained pediatricians and nurses work in the Center to 
assess, treat, and document injuries and evidence in conjunction with their evaluation of 
the victim. In other jurisdictions, the victims are brought to a hospital where the attending 
physician may, or may not, have experience in treating the victims of child abuse, or 
sexual abuse.  
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Prosecutors and government attorneys representing children also have a place in 
the response to child abuse. In many jurisdictions, when responding to crimes of a serious 
nature, prosecutors are frequently involved in the investigation. When dealing with the 
unique and fragile nature of child abuse investigations, prosecutors are frequently 
involved to assess the value of evidence and provide guidance. Other government 
attorneys are also involved in other legal areas involving children, such as custody and 
civil court proceedings.  
When addressing matters representing a high level of seriousness, such as child 
abuse, teamwork is essential. To accomplish overall goals, the creation or formation of a 
team is very important. In addition to coordinating the various roles of team members, 
well-functioning child abuse MDTs frequently move into the arenas of group decision 
making, policy evaluation and recommendations, and coordinated strategies to apply to 
individual cases.190 
Some of the recognized benefits to child abuse MDTs include: 
 Leaner and more efficient use of scarce resources 
 Better decisions made by groups with pertinent and multifaceted 
experience 
 Better investigative, prosecutorial, and treatment outcomes 
 Better understanding of roles and responsibilities leading to increased 
positive outcomes 
 A higher level of community respect 
 Lower levels of burnout and turnover among team members 
 Lower amount of exposure to multiple agencies by victims191 
Once the importance of the use of MDTs in child abuse investigations has been 
accepted, the next step involves the creation and maintenance of a team. Critical steps to 
forming a MDT include: 
 Identifying and recruiting members 
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 Creating and writing a mission statement 
 Creating and writing policies and protocols 
 Evaluating the impact of laws on the group’s mission 
 Establishing and maintain relationships 
 Evaluation192 
In Montgomery County, the MDT design is used for child abuse investigations 
and treatment plans. Any member of the team has the authority to call a MDT meeting to 
present issues related to a case for the team to discuss with the intent of producing a 
collective agreement on a path forward.  
The model brings together representatives from the County’s DHHS’ child 
welfare services, police department, State’s Attorney’s Office, County Attorney’s Office, 
and the Primary Care Coalition of Montgomery County. The team is a public private 
partnership. According to the Montgomery County memorandum of understanding and 
operational agreement for the Tree House Child Assessment Center of Montgomery 
County, Maryland: 
This agreement is set forth to enable the Montgomery County 
Multidisciplinary Team to pursue the well-established process of the 
interdisciplinary approach to cases of child maltreatment which includes, 
but is not limited to the following: 
A.  Sharing information and resources to enhance each step of the case 
intervention process.  
B.  Responding effectively and efficiently to all child protection issues 
of mutual concern.  
C.  Ensuring that victims and their families receive community-based 
services in a timely fashion in order to reduce the stress on the 
family system.  
D.  Providing an environment to allow each discipline to bring the 
training, experience and resources to the table to address child 
maltreatment and case management.  
                                                 192 Ellis, Forming a Multidisciplinary Team to Investigate Child Abuse. 
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E.  Monitoring collaborative case management and service provision 
to ensure quality of treatment to support healthy outcomes.  
F.  Enhancing communication between and among all MDT 
operations.  
G.  Providing opportunity for feedback on Tree House and MDT 
operations.  
H.  Conducting peer reviews for all Tree House staff.193 
The negative consequences of the failure of teamwork and cooperation among 
disciplines involved in the investigation and response to child abuse involve the 
continuation of child victimization and the possible failure to detect cases of child abuse. 
In 1995, a New York State commission investigating the failure to prevent the death of a 
child victim determined that part of the blame was due to, “an appalling lack of 
communication and coordination among the agencies investigating reports of possible 
abuse.”194 In response, the commission recommended the creation of legislation 
facilitating the sharing of information among MDT members.  
The number of reports of child abuse and neglect has increased over the last 
several decades. The increase in cases has tested the limits of practitioners and agencies 
tasked with investigation and treatment. According to a report issued by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ), attention to these cases has assisted in focusing attention on 
the problem, but has also led to a spectrum of accusations varying from government 
overreach to government inaction.195 
A. APPLICATION TO CVE 
When comparing the collaborative efforts of CVE programs with CACs, many 
structural and goal similarities appear. In Montgomery County, the MDT structure 
already exists, and many of the partners are the same as those involved in the county’s 
                                                 193 Montgomery County, Montgomery County Memorandum of Understanding and Operational 
Agreement for the Tree House Child Assessment Center of Montgomery County, Maryland (Montgomery 
County, MD: 2013). 
194 Ellis, Forming a Multidisciplinary Team to Investigate Child Abuse, 2. 
195 Ibid., 3. 
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CVE program. Child abuse and radicalization are both complex issues that require 
collaborative solutions. In Maryland, the law was amended to allow for the 
communication between partners on child abuse MDTs.196 Other states have created or 
altered existing law for the same purpose. According to the Department of Criminal 
Justice Services for the Commonwealth of Virginia, “MDT members can share 
information. When the 2004 General Assembly made the above-referenced changes to 
section 63. 2-1503 (K) regarding the purpose and composition of child abuse and neglect 
MDTs, the specifically included language allowing team members to share 
information.”197 
According to its strategic plan, the BRAVE model in place in Montgomery 
County describes itself as a CII.198 “Collective impact is a framework to tackle deeply 
entrenched and complex social problems. It is an innovative and structured approach to 
making collaboration work across government, business, philanthropy, non-profit 
organizations and citizens to achieve significant and lasting social change.”199 The idea 
of a CII was first written about in the Stanford Social Innovation Review in 2011. 
According to the article, five key elements are needed for a successful program: a 
common agenda, shared measurements systems, mutually reinforcing activities, 
continuous communication, and a backbone support organization. See Figure 6.  
                                                 196 State of Maryland, 22. Medical Records Act--Duty to Hold Confidential and Duty to Disclose a 
Medical Record, Health-General Article § § 4-301--4-309, 8-601. 
197 Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, Information Sharing and the Multidisciplinary 
Child Abuse Team (Richmond, VA: Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2005), 2, https://www.dcjs. 
virginia.gov/juvenile/resources/infoSharing.pdf. 
198 World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), The Building Resilience 
against Violent Extremism (BRAVE) Model—A Collective Impact Initiative That Increases Public Safety 
and Social Cohesion, 12. 




Figure 6.  Collective Impact Initiative.200 
CIIs are models that may be applied to organizational structures to ensure that 
practitioners are working together to achieve a common goal. The BRAVE model is 
currently the only true community led CVE initiative in existence.  
B. THE FBI’S SHARED RESPONSIBILITY COMMITTEES 
In the spring of 2016, media sources began reporting that the FBI had created 
SRCs that were being used as MDTs to control and facilitate the actions of CVE 
practitioners involved in intervention efforts with individuals referred by the FBI. One 
source, The Intercept, claimed to have a copy of a letter issued by the FBI to CVE 
members of SRCs. According to reports, and the letter itself, the FBI was seeking to 
create voluntary SRCs within CVE programs to define the boundaries and rules regarding 
individuals referred from the FBI.201 
According to The Intercept, George Washington University Professor Seamus 
Hughes advised: 
                                                 200 Source: “The Collective Impact Framework | Collaboration for Impact.” 
201 Cora Currier and Murtaza Hussain, “Letter Details FBI Plan for Secretive Anti-Radicalization 
Committees,” The Intercept, April 28, 2016, https://theintercept.com/2016/04/28/letter-details-fbi-plan-for-
secretive-anti-radicalization-committees/. 
 74
if implemented transparently, the SRCs could offer the promise of an “off 
ramp” for people on the road to radicalization or arrest. ‘We haven’t 
provided families with any tools to help them. Parents are taking passports 
away, bringing their kids to local imams, but these are ad hoc approaches 
set up to fail with no support system in place. Law enforcement is given 
very few options besides arrest. There are a lot of attacks on heavy-handed 
counter-terrorism approaches, like the informants and agent provocateurs, 
but that’s the status quo now until we have other options.202 
According to the letter, the FBI defines SRCs as, “multi-disciplinary groups 
voluntarily formed in local communities.”203 The letter outlines how the FBI may refer 
“potentially violent extremists for intervention so long as the SRC operates within the 
FBI’s rules.”204 The FBI has not confirmed the existence of the letter and has been 
accused of implementing the SRC program in secrecy. The FBI has admitted that the 
SRC program is a limited “pilot” program but has not confirmed where the program is 
being used.205 
According to the letter and media sources, the primary goal of the SRC is 
disengagement where the, “social and psychological process whereby an individual’s 
commitment to violence as a solution to a grievance is reduced to such an extent that 
he/she is no longer at risk of using violence as a solution to a grievance.”206 The letter 
claims that the FBI’s goal in referring individuals to SRCs is not to alter political or 
religious beliefs.  
Some of the main points of the letter include the following:207 
 The FBI is not part of the SRC.  
 Once the FBI refers an individual, the SRC will decide if appropriate 
treatment may be applied.  
                                                 202 Hussain and McLaughlin, “FBI’s ‘Shared Responsibility Committees’ to Identify ‘Radicalized’ 
Muslims Raise Alarms.” 
203 “FBI-SRC-Letter,” April 28, 2016, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2815794-FBI-
SRC-Letter.html. 
204 Ibid. 




 The SRC will then be responsible for designing and implementing a 
treatment plan.  
 A referral will not preclude the FBI from conducting an investigation of 
the referred subject; however, the FBI will not use the SRC to gather 
intelligence.  
 The FBI will not share investigative details with the SRC.  
 Any investigation or prosecution may be conducted without notifying the 
SRC.  
 Once a referral has been made, members of the SRC may share 
confidential PHI in accordance with applicable law.  
 SRC members will sign confidentiality agreements, which forbid members 
from discussing the FBI referrals with anyone outside of the SRC or FBI, 
to include other LE members.  
 The onus is placed on SRC members to reasonable ensure any information 
passed back to the FBI is accurate.  
 The FBI reserves the right to stop making referrals to the SRC.  
 The SRC may share best practices with other SRCs.  
 SRC members may not seek outside consultation with other experts on the 
treatment of referred individuals without the written consent of the FBI.  
 The FBI will not disclose the identities of the SRC members unless legally 
required to do so (represents another form of risk for CVE practitioners).  
 SRC members will be required to sign federal form FC-857 for instances 
when they are exposed to sensitive, although unclassified, information.  
 The FBI and DOJ will provide yearly training to SRC members on the 
handling of sensitive information and materials.  
 The SRC will share all information on the referred individuals who pose a 
threat of violence to any other individual, group, or the public in a manner 
consistent with applicable laws.  
 The SRC will notify the FBI when a referred individual is not responding 
to treatment.  
 SRC may notify the FBI of the progression of treatment.  
 76
 Any information shared with the FBI may then be passed on to other LE, 
members of the U.S. intelligence community, or representatives of foreign 
governments.  
 Financial and civil liability resides with the SRC members who are 
required to provide their own insurance and legal representation when 
needed.  
 The letter of agreement makes no promise of funding.  
Referrals made by the federal government of potentially radicalized individuals to 
SRCs would most likely represent a small but critical portion of treatment by CVE 
programs. The FBI certainly has an obligation to protect the integrity of its 
responsibilities. The manner the FBI has moved forward with SRCs and the construct of 
the agreement letter, however, do raise some concerns. For example, one of the main 
tenets of the CVE program is community outreach. Relationships between community 
and government, like all relationships, are based on trust. A semi-secret implementation 
of a program with such important consequences does not help this effort. According to 
the Muslim Public Affairs Council: 
This lack of transparency is harmful to the very goal the FBI is trying to 
achieve. Any individual who is being counseled by his/her imam, social 
worker, or therapist, will wonder if these individuals are working with the 
FBI—an entity that could very well arrest him/her and does not have any 
actual concern for his/her well-being.208 
The letter also appears to move the lion’s share of risk onto SRCs. This level of 
risk does not create an atmosphere where the most qualified practitioners would be most 
willing to partake in risky work that carries such an important role. The contents of the 
letter also do not create a trusting relationship between the FBI and the various public and 
private partners engaged in CVE endeavors. The letter also gives the FBI the appearance 
of hypocrisy. On one hand, the letter claims that the FBI will not use the SRC to gather 
intelligence, and then goes on to strictly set the rules mandating a one-way flow of 
information from the SCR to the FBI. Once again, the FBI has a responsibility to conduct 
                                                 208 Muslim Public Affairs Council, “The Problem with the FBI’s ‘Shared Responsibility 
Committees,’” Muslim Public Affairs Council, March 31, 2016, http://www.2fwww.mpac.org/policy-
analysis/the-problem-with-the-fbis-shared-responsibility-committees.php. 
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its business, but the approach taken as outlined in the letter does not create a trusting and 
inclusive relationship.  
The FBI will possess a lot of information concerning its referrals, which it 
understandably will not be able to share. However, successful treatment of referred 
persons also requires CVE practitioners be informed of certain information concerning an 
individual for whom they will creating and implementing a treatment plan. The fact the 
FBI may continue, or begin, a criminal investigation of a referred individual without the 
SRC’s knowledge is understandable; however, the FBI’s lack of presence on the SRC is 
not. The bottom line in regards to the letter and the role of the FBI and SRC members is 
that it appears that the FBI wants its cake, and to eat it as well, and to deny any cake to 
anybody else.  
Much of the criticism of the FBI’s SRC program has come from civil liberty and 
watch dog agencies, such as the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) 
and the Muslim Public Affairs Council.209 The ADC has demanded that the FBI cancel 
the program.210 One of the main accusations is that the program is a front for the 
expansion of FBI informant networks. Unfortunately for the FBI and CVE programs, this 
accusation is easy to make. The appearance that the FBI is using professionals and 
communities to expand surveillance of specific communities may validate existing claims 
that CVE programs stigmatize and unfairly target certain portions of communities. This 
phenomenon also runs contrary to community engagement theories.  
The FBIs reference to CVE practitioners as an MDT may be technically accurate, 
but the FBI’s approach violates the spirit of MDTs. MDTs include all relevant 
practitioners who work together to solve problems by combining the expertise of all. By 
not including itself in the MDT, the FBI is excluding its expertise, and probably some 
information held that would be better served shared.  
                                                 209 “ADC Demands Cancellation of ‘Shared Responsibility Committees’ FBI Informant Program,” 
March 25, 2016, http://www.adc.org/2016/03/adc-demands-cancellation-of-shared-responsibility-committ 
ees-fbi-informant-program/; Muslim Public Affairs Council, “The Problem with the FBI’s ‘Shared 
Responsibility Committees.’” 
210 “ADC Demands Cancellation of ‘Shared Responsibility Committees’ FBI Informant Program.” 
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For all its good intentions, the design and roll out of the FBI SRC plan may do 
more harm than good. The FBI may be in a hurry to refer individuals to CVE programs, 
but not having the proper partners and relationships in place prior to kick off is never 
advisable. The result may be distrust or an undermining of what the CVE program could 
do to build relationships, help others, and protect the country.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A number of common and repeated themes are inherent in the topic of this thesis. 
The issues of risk and threats to the community, community trust, delegation of roles, 
investigative restrictions, and importance of intelligence remain as challenges that must 
be addressed.  
One of the most important elements of a successful CVE program will involve 
assembling the right team and establishing relationships between the stakeholders. This 
researcher would refer to the definition in the newest SIP and re-iterate that this group 
involves the public, LE, mental health practitioners, government leaders, attorneys, 
educators, NGOs, and private entities. Each element must not only understand its own 
role, but the roles of others for the effort to succeed. The importance of the relationship 
with the public was discussed previously. Two of the most important groups that need to 
establish strong working relationships include the mental health practitioners and LE. The 
theory of therapeutic jurisprudence, as proposed by Wexler and Winick may help to 
explain the difference between the two fields, and the important relations between the 
two. Frequently, practitioners of each discipline do not understand the role of the other. 
As a result, the two fields tend to work independent of each other and view the other with 
suspicion. The truth is that both fields share basic values and missions. To gain the best 
results, practitioners from both fields need to depend on the expertise of the other to 
achieve a better result. Both disciplines must develop a true collaborative and 
understanding relationship for the best results to occur. Fortunately, this relationship 
occurs in other areas, such as drug and gang diversion programs and in CACs.  
For CVE intervention programs to operate successfully, stakeholders (using the 
same definition from the current SIP) must understand the law. The three areas of law 
(both federal and state) that have the greatest impact on CVE intervention programs 
include medical record confidentiality laws, national security laws, and duty to warn or 
protect laws. An analysis of the federal national security laws reveals that the impact of 
the Patriot Act’s Section 215 represents a smaller change than is expressed in literature. It 
is critical that stakeholders receive comprehensive training on these laws. As noted 
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earlier, many segments of government and the private sector frequently hire outside 
experts to train their employees on such topics. The training should be provided to all 
stakeholders. It is important that stakeholders to whom the laws may not directly apply, 
such as LE, understand the legal environment in which their partners must work. It is also 
important that the training be specific to the state in which the program is operating, and 
any neighboring states with which the program may overlap.  
A. CVE INTERVENTION PROGRAM ORGANIZATION 
CVE programs should study and apply the tenets of collaborative models, such as 
CIIs and MDTs. CVE programs, in general, may benefit from a CII structure. For more 
information on the BRAVE model, refer to its strategic plan.211 
CVE intervention programs should be managed and run by a MDT comprised of 
the applicable professionals. Since the goal of an intervention program is provided by 
mental health professionals, the MDT should be led by an experienced mental health 
practitioner. The MDT would be tasked with screening and assigning patients for 
treatment. The team would then monitor progress and oversee the application of 
resources to the treatment plan. Once assigned to other professionals within the program, 
the MDT would stand back and monitor based on the advice of the treating professional.  
The MDT would also consist of LE and legal experts. The goal of the team would 
be to address any issues and make suggestions on plans to address the issues. The 
creation of the team, similar to MDTs used for child abuse investigations, would facilitate 
a cooperative working environment on the appropriate practitioners who would bring 
relevant experience to the effort. It is possible that states hosting CVE programs should 
study existing laws facilitating information sharing among MDT members engaged in 
responding to child abuse. In states that have created or altered laws to facilitate the 
sharing of otherwise protected information in these situations; similar laws may be 
needed for CVE intervention programs.  
                                                 211 World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), The Building Resilience 
against Violent Extremism (BRAVE) Model—A Collective Impact Initiative That Increases Public Safety 
and Social Cohesion. 
 81
The MDT would also monitor and respond to training needs for members of the 
program, allied partners, and the public. The MDT would also be responsible for the 
application of HIPAA and state medical law requirements.  
Public and private entities involved in CVE, and specifically intervention, should 
consider the creation of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between involved 
organizations. A MOU would describe roles and set rules prior to establishing a group 
effort. The MOU would benefit by setting rules and expectations prior to any 
disagreements. If a CVE program is going to accept referrals from the federal 
government, they may consider including the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the 
MOU. Another option would be for the CVE itself to create a contract with the FBI 
(similar to a reverse SRC letter) to take the burden off of the FBI and stimulate a more 
fair perception of the process. The contract between the CVE program and the FBI would 
still acknowledge the responsibility the federal government has to protect the country, 
and balance the need for information with existing laws and regulations. The danger to 
the relationship between the federal government, local governments, and community led 
groups is the federal government’s tendency to use funding to ensure it gets what it 
wants. The federal government should limit itself to coordinating research and providing 
advice, collating research, funding, referrals, and traditional investigative efforts. The 
federal government should also stay focused on its correct assessment that local 
governments are better positioned to create community relationships and understand the 
needs at the local level. The expertise to put the elements of CVE into practice resides at 
the local level.  
B. MEDICAL CONFIDENTIALITY 
In relation to medical confidentiality laws, it is imperative that practitioners 
understand the existence of both the federal HIPAA law and specific state laws. In 
relation to HIPAA, stakeholders must understand that the Privacy Rule only identifies 
two mandatory disclosures of PHI, to the patient, and to DHHS for auditing purposes. 
The remaining exceptions provide permissible conditions for mental health practitioners 
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to share information. Relationships must be in place prior to the treatment of clients so 
that stakeholders understand the law and know who needs access to information.  
CVE programs must also determine if they constitute a hybrid entity and identify 
the part of the program that must operate under medical record laws. The program will 
then be responsible for segregating the portions of the program so that PHI remains 
secure.  
Programs involved in intervention and diversion efforts must then be prepared to 
notify their clients of the laws, and the impact of the laws on their treatment and 
confidential information. CVE programs will be responsible for creating and 
implementing policies and procedures to ensure the protection of PHI and training their 
employees. These programs are also responsible for designating employees to be 
responsible and accountable for the requirements.  
Programs will most likely advise clients of their privacy rights afforded by the 
Privacy Rule when they are first registered. It is an opportune time to ask the client for 
consent to share their PHI, and explain under what circumstances this sharing may be 
done. Consent is the easiest and cleanest practice that may address the issue of 
communication among stakeholders. The process must include a written waiver 
completed by the client. The waiver must include the length of the consent and under 
what circumstances it may be revoked. Under Maryland law, the consent process is 
described under §4-303.212 
CVE practitioners may also consider the use of de-identified PHI used in a “safe 
harbor” method of sharing when consulting with other stakeholders as long as the 
information does not identify the client. It is a limited use of PHI, but one that may be 
considered when other options are not available.  
Like the Privacy Rule, Maryland state laws on medical record confidentiality are 
permissive in nature. Maryland law is broader than the federal law in regards to whom 
PHI may be shared. Maryland law allows for the disclosure of PHI to any government 
                                                 212 State of Maryland, 22. Medical Records Act--Duty to Hold Confidential and Duty to Disclose a 
Medical Record, Health-General Article § § 4-301--4-309, 8-601. 
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agency conducting authorized actions (as described by law). Practitioners will be 
challenged when blending state and federal law. Maryland law also allows for the release 
of information for an investigative process. The law does stipulate that the receiving 
agency must have written policies in place to protect the information. Many LE agencies 
do not have written procedures for the protection and safe storing of PHI. As a result, LE 
agencies involved in CVE actions must create these types of policies.  
Practitioners in Maryland must also understand that they must disclose, or not 
disclose, PHI in compliance with the law to be immune from civil action.  
C. DUTY TO WARN AND PROTECT 
As with medical confidentiality laws, training on duty to warn and protect laws 
will be critical for mental health practitioners involved in CVE intervention and 
diversion.  
CVE intervention programs will be run and performed by mental health 
professionals. These experts should already be well versed on the ethical and legal 
conditions imposed upon their work. The practitioners may not, however, have 
experience working with other professionals from other disciplines. They also may not be 
well versed on the exceptions to confidentiality in relation to the threat presented by 
radicalized persons.  
Since duty to warn and duty to protect laws reside at the state level, practitioners 
must be aware of the laws of the state where they are practicing. Additionally, many laws 
are written in a broad manner that does not clearly articulate what is forbidden, mandated, 
or allowed. Many of these laws, such as Maryland’s, allow for discretion. Mental health 
practitioners must have access to legal experts to assist in deciphering and applying the 
law, which is especially important when situations are frequently not the same.  
Mental health professionals have an obligation to their clients. Due to the special 
relationship between mental health professionals and their clients, they may also have a 
legal obligation to protect third parties from the actions of their clients. This balance of 
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confidentiality needed to provide mental health treatment successfully must be balanced 
with any threat to the public.  
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